Trinity College

Trinity College Digital Repository
Senior Theses and Projects

Student Scholarship

Spring 2017

Twin Crises and the Financial Accelerator
Andrew Calabrese
Trinity College, Hartford Connecticut, andrew.calabrese@trincoll.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalrepository.trincoll.edu/theses
Part of the Econometrics Commons, and the International Economics Commons

Recommended Citation
Calabrese, Andrew, "Twin Crises and the Financial Accelerator". Senior Theses, Trinity College, Hartford,
CT 2017.
Trinity College Digital Repository, https://digitalrepository.trincoll.edu/theses/631

Twin Crises and the Financial Accelerator

By

Andrew Calabrese

A Thesis Submitted to the Department of Economics
of Trinity College in Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Bachelor of Arts Degree

Economics 498-99

April 6th, 2017

Abstract
The incidence of simultaneous banking and currency crises is a recurring theme in
emerging economies operating under fixed or quasi-fixed exchange rates. This thesis conducts
an empirical analysis of the underlying determinants of so called “twin crises” by applying a
probit econometric model to a sample of 48 emerging economies during the 1980-2013 period.
Current account deficits are found to be a robust driver of twin crises, with vulnerability
increasing in the size of the deficit relative to GDP. There is also evidence that real exchange
rate appreciation and higher levels of short-term debt relative to reserves increase crisis
probability. Recommendations for prevention policies include a reduction in agency costs
through improved regulation and data transparency, the implementation of a managed float
exchange rate regime, and the use of price-based controls on capital inflows.

i

To my parents.

ii

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank Professor Miguel Ramirez for being a trusted adviser, mentor, and
friend. His guidance has been indispensable not only in completing this thesis, but in navigating
my four years at Trinity. Professor Ramirez’s passion for the study of economics, and his
willingness to share it with his students, embodies all that is great about the liberal arts.
I would also like to thank Professor Adam Grossberg for his incredibly helpful guidance
on econometric issues, and Professor Nichole Szembrot for her useful comments during the
senior thesis seminar. Additionally, I would like to thank each professor in the Department of
Economics who I have had the privilege of studying under. Without their instruction, this thesis
would not have been possible. Finally, I would like to thank the men and women of Trinity
College who I have been fortunate to call my friends. I will continue to do so for the rest of my
life.

iii

Table of Contents
Abstract .......................................................................................................................................................... i
Acknowledgements ...................................................................................................................................... iii
List of Figures ............................................................................................................................................... v
List of Tables ................................................................................................................................................ v
I: Introduction ............................................................................................................................................. 1
II: Literature Review .................................................................................................................................. 3
The Fundamental View ............................................................................................................................. 4
The Financial Panic View ......................................................................................................................... 7
The Financial Accelerator ....................................................................................................................... 12
III: Conceptual Model .............................................................................................................................. 17
IV: Empirical Model ................................................................................................................................. 27
Description of Explanatory Variables ..................................................................................................... 32
V: Results ................................................................................................................................................... 37
VI: Discussion and Policy Implications ................................................................................................... 47
Discussion of Results .............................................................................................................................. 47
Policy Implications ................................................................................................................................. 49
Limiting Agency Costs and Uncertainty............................................................................................. 50
Ensuring Current Account Stability .................................................................................................... 53
Controlling International Capital Flows ............................................................................................. 57
Crisis Response: A Brief Overview .................................................................................................... 60
VII: Conclusion ......................................................................................................................................... 63
Appendix .................................................................................................................................................... 65
Appendix One: Data Notes, Sources, and Calculations .......................................................................... 65
Appendix Two: Supplementary Econometric Tables ............................................................................. 67
References .................................................................................................................................................. 73

iv

List of Figures
Figure 1: AS-AD Model with Financial Accelerator Effects

14

Figure 2: Emerging Market Crises by Year

38

Figure 3: Crisis vs. Non-Crisis Means

39

Figure 4: Effect of Current Account Deficit on Crisis Probability

40

List of Tables
Table 1: Probit Regressions

42

Table 2: Summary Statistics for Selected Crises

45

Table 3: Crises by Country

46

Table 4: Data Sources and Calculations

66

Table 5: Determination of Lags for Primary Model

67

Table 6: Country Group Results

68

Table 7: Country Group Results (cont.)

69

Table 8: Income Group Results

70

Table 9: Robustness to Various Crisis Thresholds

71

Table 10: Correlation Matrix for Explanatory Variables

72

v

I: Introduction
A common theme in modern financial history is the occurrence of simultaneous banking
and currency crises. From Latin America in the early 1980s to Asia in the late 1990s, so called
“twin crises” have routinely decimated the economies of emerging nations, leading to large and
painful contractions in real economic activity. In its most basic form, a twin crisis entails a
situation in which a country experiences in rapid succession, yet in no particular order, a severe
depreciation of its exchange rate along with widespread failures in its financial system. The
notion that banking and currency crises are closely linked was popularized by Graciela
Kaminsky and Carmen Reinhart (1999), who in an influential paper find that the onset of a
banking panic dramatically increases the likelihood that a country falls victim to a currency
crisis. Elsewhere in the literature, others have argued that it is the presence of a fixed exchange
rate that in fact sets the conditions for capital flight and a banking collapse. Regardless of the
causal direction, it is clear that the costs of twin crises are high; Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999)
find that losses in terms of GDP and reserve depletion tend to be larger in twin episodes than if
either situation were to occur independently, while Hoggarth, Reis, and Saporta (2001) calculate
the average fiscal costs borne by governments of twin crisis-affected countries to be 22.9% of
GDP.
The twin crisis phenomenon is not confined to emerging economies, yet it remains true
that these crises tend to strike emerging nations harder and far more frequently, acting as a
substantial impediment to the development process. For emerging market governments hoping
to achieve financial stability, an understanding of the anatomy of twin crises is critical for
designing appropriate prevention policies. This thesis attempts to clarify the underlying

determinants of twin crises, offering a more general view than previous analyses which have
focused intently on the dynamics of the episodes after which they were written. To do so, we
conduct a probit econometric analysis of 48 emerging economies during the 1980-2013 period,
covering nearly all recorded instances of twin episodes. Current account deficits are shown to be
a robust driver of twin crises, with vulnerability increasing in the overall deficit as a percentage
of GDP. There is also evidence that real exchange rate appreciation and higher levels of shortterm debt relative to reserves increase crisis probability, although these results are less robust to
subsample estimations that attempt to control for cross-sectional heterogeneity.
Central to our findings is that twin crises are, above all else, driven by the boom and bust
nature of international capital flows. As emerging economies open-up to global capital markets,
funds tend to arrive en masse, sustaining large current account deficits and, in cases where
regulation is weak, imprudent consumption and investment spending. When capital flows
eventually reverse course, the demands placed on both the central bank and individual borrowers
to produce foreign exchange become insurmountable, and the exchange rate and banking
systems crumble under the weight of large-scale withdrawals. Agency costs of borrowing play a
key role in this process, with high-cost emerging nations subject to a “flight to quality” as
outlined by Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1996). The flight to quality occurs as lenders in
times of stress funnel capital away from high-agency-cost borrowers and toward more stable
nations and firms. Given this general outline, policies to reduce agency costs, ensure stability in
the current account, and control the flow of international capital are proposed as a means of
preventing twin crises.
The remainder of this thesis is as follows: Section Two discusses the relevant literature,
focusing on the split between those who view fundamental factors as the proximate cause of twin
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crises and those who favor financial panic explanations. The financial accelerator model
proposed by Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1996) is also explored in the context of
international episodes; Section Three develops a conceptual framework following the debt-run
model put forward by Rodrik and Velasco (1999); Section Four outlines the broad features of our
empirical analysis, while Section Five presents the econometric results; Section Six analyzes
policy implications, and Section Seven concludes.

II: Literature Review
From an analytical standpoint, twin crises are unique in that they lie beyond the scope of
both first generation balance-of-payments models in the vein of Krugman (1979), and secondgeneration models which follow Obstfeld (1994). In the first generation conception offered by
Krugman (1979), governments are able to defend an exchange rate peg by gradually depleting
foreign reserves, a strategy that is effective until market participants launch a speculative attack
on the currency, immediately draining reserves before they would have run out under normal
circumstances. This model necessarily assumes that the maintenance of a fixed-rate regime is
unsustainable in the long-run, as evidenced by steady reserve depletion. Obstfeld (1994) shows
that the collapse of an exchange rate need not be conditioned on underlying instability, but rather
can occur in a self-fulfilling manner, as governments are prompted to abandon pegs when the
welfare costs of maintenance exceed the costs of devaluation. Maintenance costs are in turn
dependent on market expectations, with a relatively flat loss function representing a belief in
“credible commitment” to the peg, and a steeper loss function representing non-credible
commitment. Where these functions are superimposed and the non-credible curve lies above the
abandonment threshold, a shift in expectations toward non-credibility motivates the government
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to devalue, and a collapse of the currency therefore becomes an endogenous outcome of
investors’ beliefs (Arghyrou and Tsoukalas 2011).
A notable shortcoming of both the first and second generation models is that they fail to
connect banking and currency crises, despite empirical evidence which suggests the two are
intimately linked (Kaminsky and Reinhart 1999). Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) study a sample
of 26 banking and 76 currency crises between 1970 and 1995, identifying 19 instances where the
two occurred in the same country within 48 months. The authors show that while the
unconditional probability of a currency crisis in their sample is 29 percent, the probability of one
occurring within twenty-four months after the start of a banking crisis is 46 percent. This finding
suggests that banking crises play a large role in precipitating exchange rate issues.
In addition to Kaminsky and Reinhart’s (1999) aforementioned findings on the costs of
twin crises, Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) show that losses in terms of GDP following twin
episodes in Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, and Argentina all exceeded the historical average for
banking crises. Hoggarth, Reis, and Saporta (2001) calculate the average fiscal costs borne by
governments of twin crisis-affected countries to be 22.9% of GDP, versus only 4.6% when just a
banking crisis occurs. Taken in sum, relevant data clearly exhibit the severity with which twin
crises can topple emerging economies.
The Fundamental View
Central to Kaminsky and Reinhart’s work is a contention that twin crises almost always
stem from fundamental weaknesses that develop in the wake of financial liberalization, a view
that has found wide support in the literature. Goldfajn and Valdes (1997) argue that, due to
deregulation, both capital inflows and domestic credit provision tend to increase markedly in the
years immediately preceding crises. These developments are identified as key harbingers of
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banking problems by Sachs, Tornell, and Velasco (1998). Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) add
empirical strength to this view, showing that the ratio of both M2/foreign reserves (a measure of
international exposure) and domestic credit/GDP dramatically exceed normal levels during the
build-up to twin episodes. As a result, both output and exports lag their respective averages in
pre-crisis periods. A large body of literature has fallen in-line with the argument that
liberalization-induced weaknesses lie at the heart of twin crises, and this point of view will
henceforth be referred to as the “fundamental school.”
A commonly cited driver of post-liberalization crises is moral hazard, or the failure of
economic agents to protect against risks due to the implicit or explicit presence of some form of
insurance. Corsetti, Pesenti, and Roubini (1998) develop a formal model in which moral hazard
leads to eventual exchange rate and financial collapse by encouraging risky credit provision.
Under this framework, implicit or explicit guarantees of private debt by the government create an
incentive for foreign lenders to finance unprofitable investments made by domestic firms. This
practice is sustainable until publicly-backed debts exceed foreign reserves, at which point
expectations of inflationary financing set in and the currency falls under speculative attack.
Reserves become insufficient to bail-out domestic firms, resulting in a financial crisis. Corsetti,
Pesenti, and Roubini test their model through a linear regression of financial and fundamental
variables against a “crisis index”, finding that large current account deficits, high levels of nonperforming loans, and low foreign reserves relative to the domestic stock of money all contribute
significantly to the development and worsening of twin crises.1
Additional empirical backing for the moral hazard explanation is provided by DemirgüçKunt and Detragiache (1998), who through a multivariate logit model find that the presence of

1

The crisis index developed by Corsetti, Pesenti, and Roubini (1998) represents a weighted average of the
percentage rate of currency depreciation against the U.S. dollar and percentage rate of foreign reserve depletion.
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deposit insurance increases the likelihood that a country falls victim to a banking crisis. This
interesting result suggests that the guarantees provided by deposit insurance contribute to
excessive lending under conditions of moral hazard. Although not captured explicitly in their
model, Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (1998) note that the relationship between deposit
insurance and moral hazard is likely present only in situations where financial liberalization
reduces prudential regulation of the banking system. Supporting the notion that fundamental
weaknesses can also contribute to a slowdown in the real economy, Demirgüç-Kunt and
Detragiache (1998) show low GDP growth, high inflation, and high real rates of interest to be
closely associated with banking crises. Furthermore, high levels of M2/reserves are revealed to
increase crisis probability, consistent with Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) and Corsetti, Pesenti,
and Roubini (1998). While Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (1998) focus their analysis solely
on banking crises, their results are significant given the connection between banking and
currency panics demonstrated in Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999).
Sachs, Tornell, and Velasco (1998) make an important extension to the preceding
literature by demonstrating how weak fundamentals can create the conditions necessary for selffulfilling runs on central and commercial banks. The authors argue that foreign investors gauge
returns in terms of their own currency, and therefore consider the possibility of devaluation when
investing abroad. Rational investors assume that so long as the recipient country’s central bank
maintains reserves in excess of the domestic money supply (guaranteeing its ability to meet all
redemptions), then a devaluation is unnecessary even in the event of a large capital outflow. If
reserves fall below the money supply, a country must address outflows and the ensuing balanceof-payments shortfall in two ways: reducing domestic consumption and investment, or electing
for a real exchange rate devaluation. Nations with frail banking systems will have little appetite
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for the former option due to its recessionary consequences, and are thus believed to prefer
devaluation. Given this belief, the rational equilibrium entails runs on the banking system and
exchange rate regime, actions which in and of themselves bring about the originally feared
devaluation.
Sachs, Tornell, and Velasco (1998) test this model empirically using panel data for a
sample of twenty countries between 1994 and 1995, a period coinciding with crises in Mexico
and Argentina, among others. As expected, they find that significant real exchange rate
appreciation, large increases in bank loans/GDP, and high levels of M2/reserves all help to
predict the incidence of a crisis. Most notably, if fundamentals (measured by exchange rate
appreciation and credit expansion) are weak but M2/reserves is low, crises are unlikely,
supporting the authors’ conjecture that insufficient reserves are necessary for a crisis to become
self-fulfilling.
The Financial Panic View
At its core, the fundamental view of twin crises can be thought of as focusing on the asset
side of a country’s balance sheet; while crises are ultimately manifested as a run on liabilities, it
is deteriorating asset quality which serves as the impetus for the necessary shift in expectations.
In contrast, a second, competing school argues that such episodes in fact stem from the liability
side, taking the form of self-fulfilling crises which require little or no fundamental weakness.
Following Chang (1999), this line of reasoning is known as the “financial panic view.” Models
in the financial panic tradition overwhelmingly rely on the seminal bank run model presented by
Diamond and Dybvig (1983), and any discussion of their predictions therefore requires an
explanation this cornerstone theory.
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Diamond (2007) provides a clear, simplified description of the Diamond and Dybivg
(1983) model. Diamond and Dybvig begin with the assumption that there are two types of
investors in the world: Type 1, who prefer to consume in time T = 1, and Type 2, who prefer to
consume in time T = 2. At T = 0, all agents are given 1 unit to invest, but do not know whether
they will end up being Type 1 or Type 2 consumers. The probability of any agent being Type 1
is given by t, and the probability of being Type 2 is therefore (1 – t). Because agents are unsure
of their consumption preferences, but cannot directly insure against this uncertainty, all favor
investment in a liquid asset over an illiquid one.2 Diamond and Dybvig (1983) further assume
that, despite this preference, all investors must hold the illiquid asset if they are to do so directly.
Banks, however, can transform agents’ illiquid holdings into liquid demand deposits, and thus
serve an important intermediary function.
Diamond (2007) shows that banks’ ability to transform liquidity is made possible by
investing their depositors’ money in an illiquid asset that provides a return, R, in T = 2 that is
greater than the return achievable in T = 1. Given this, they can offer all depositors a liquid asset
that returns r1 in period 1, and r2 =

[1−𝑡𝑟1 ]𝑅
1−𝑡

in period 2 (Diamond 2007). Importantly, the period

1 return of this liquid asset is greater than the period 1 return offered by selling the original
illiquid asset early (Diamond 2007). Note also that the payout promised to investors in period 2
is simply the rate of return provided by the illiquid asset, times the number of assets remaining in
the bank in period 2 (after Type 1 investors have withdrawn), split among all remaining
depositors. The bank has therefore created liquidity, giving investors the option to withdraw in
either period 1 or 2 and still realize an appropriate return. Witness, though, that if enough
Diamond (2007) demonstrates this numerically. The investor’s utility function is represented by tU (r1) + (1 – t)U
(r2). If t = 0.25, and the return profile of the illiquid asset is (r1 = 1, r2 = 2), then the utility from the illiquid asset is
0.25(1) + 0.75(2) = 0.375. If a more liquid asset has a return profile of (r1 = 1.28, r2 = 1.813), then utility from this
more liquid asset is 0.25(1.28) + 0.75(1.813) = 0.391 > 0.375. Investors therefore prefer the more liquid asset.
2
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depositors (denoted by f ) seek to withdraw in period 1, so that f r1 is greater than the bank’s total
portfolio value, then the bank is suddenly unable to give investors their promised returns in either
period (Diamond 2007). If investors expect that withdrawals will be substantial enough to meet
this condition, the rational choice is for all of them to withdraw immediately, leading to a
collapse of the institution. Critical to this analysis is the role of expectations; so long as agents
believe that withdrawals will not exceed a level that causes the bank to fail, equilibrium dictates
that the bank will in fact not fail. Banking crises in the Diamond-Dybvig framework are
therefore entirely self-fulfilling phenomena, with both the run and remain equilibria representing
perfectly rational outcomes given investors’ expectations of how others will behave.3
Goldfajn and Valdes (1997) extend Diamond-Dybvig (1983) to explain large capital
outflows consistent with twin episodes. For any investment in a foreign country, there is a
threshold level of profitability that makes it preferable to hold assets in this country as opposed
to more liquid international alternatives. Below this level, the rational choice is to invest
elsewhere. Because such investments are made through banks and other financial intermediaries,
the profitability threshold can be thought of as the return R of an illiquid asset, as in DiamondDybvig. In Goldfajn and Valdes’s case, R is dependent on the returns given by domestic
technology, so that an adverse development such as a productivity shock can push expectations
toward the run equilibrium. Because the banking system’s liabilities are ultimately denominated
in foreign currency (due to free convertibility), this equilibrium also takes the form of a run on
the central bank, which must either draw down reserves to meet redemptions or devalue.
Another interesting possibility in this model is that the shock which sets off a run is the fear of
devaluation itself, as a devaluation would push the return to investors (denominated in their own

3

The summary of Diamond-Dybvig (1983) provided here draws heavily on Diamond (2007).
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currency) below the run-threshold level. Goldfajn and Valdes’s analysis is very similar to that of
Sachs, Tornell, and Velasco (1998), yet doesn’t require weak fundamentals pre-shock.
While many analysts examine financial panic in the context of self-fulfilling runs,
Marshall (1998) stresses the risks of large-scale coordination failure. To explain how
coordination failure can facilitate systemic crises, he first assumes that all economies require a
specific level of external credit in order to finance working capital. Above this level,
investments in the country produce returns in excess of safe international alternatives, but below
the threshold, returns are 0 as the country collectively fails to meet its working capital needs.
Critically, Marshall makes the realistic assumption that a nation’s financing requirements are
beyond what any one lender can provide on its own. As a result, there exists a clear coordination
problem: if all lenders provide enough capital, then all achieve a return in excess of available
alternatives. If lenders believe that a sufficient number of others will opt-out, then they too will
opt out (Marshall 1998). Rather than cause a run on banks, the opt-out equilibrium in this case
entails a severe deficiency in capital used to finance business investment, leading to sharp
contraction in economic output and a collapse of the exchange rate. Marshall (1998) notes that
the recessionary dynamics at work here are similar to those in Keynes’s (1936) “beauty contest”
metaphor, wherein aggregate investment is largely dependent on market participants’
assessments of others’ willingness to invest. As bankruptcies begin to pile up, financial
institutions accumulate non-performing loans, and they too experience crises. The systemic
panic engendered by coordination failure is entirely avoidable so long as enough capital is
forthcoming from investors, demonstrating that countries need not have poor fundamentals to
experience a twin crisis.
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Analyzing the East Asian crises of the late 1990s, Radelet and Sachs (1998) also point to
coordination failure as a potential source of crisis development. Radelet and Sachs note that an
important distinction exists between an insolvent borrower, which lacks the net worth to honor
its obligations, and an illiquid borrower, which simply lacks the cash to do so immediately. In
their view, countries can have perfectly strong fundamentals (indicating solvency) and still be
prone to liquidity crises should short-term obligations exceed the ability to repay all at once.
Crucially, even an illiquid borrower can survive if creditors agree to roll over debt, and
coordination among lenders, or lack thereof, is thus central to the determination of whether or
not a country enters crisis. Radelet and Sachs show that Thailand, Argentina, Mexico, Indonesia,
and Korea all maintained short-term debt/reserve ratios greater than one in the years immediately
before suffering twin crises, suggesting that illiquidity was indeed a factor in generating
vulnerability. Yet at the same time, the Philippines, which experienced a twin crisis in 1997,
held sufficient reserves to meet its obligations, indicating that although illiquidity increases the
risk of a crisis, it is not required for one to occur. Indeed, Hong Kong fell victim to speculative
attacks against both its currency and stock market in 1998 despite maintaining complete U.S.
dollar backing of the monetary base (due to a currency board regime). While Hong Kong was
able to repel the attacks, maintenance of its peg came at the expense of a more than 5% decline
in real GDP (Harake and Meade 2014). Hong Kong’s experience further illustrates the fact that
illiquidity is a sufficient but not necessary condition for economic crises to occur in the event of
mass capital outflows.
As many analysts, including Radelet and Sachs (1998), stress, a high ratio of M2 to
foreign reserves appears to expose a country to twin crises by making it vulnerable to currencycrushing capital outflows. Within the literature, this condition has been dubbed “international
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illiquidity”, and is explored formally by Chang and Velasco (2000). Chang and Velasco (2000)
contend that under a fixed-rate regime, “the liabilities of banks are, implicitly, obligations in
international currency.” Runs are therefore possible when foreign liabilities exceed liquid
reserves, as complete repayment would be impossible at the existing rate. Chang and Velasco
(2000) note that in the event of a crisis, the central bank can defend the peg, eliminating its
lender of last resort function, or abandon the peg and extend credit to the banking system, which
would serve to deplete already scant reserves. Whether a crisis takes the form of a banking or
currency panic is therefore dependent on central bank policy, but in either case the emergence of
a run is conditioned on international illiquidity.
Rodrik and Velasco (1999) examine the issues posed by illiquidity empirically, sampling
32 emerging economies in the 1988-1998 period. They find that countries which experienced
financial crises ran short-term debt/reserve levels roughly twice those of non-crisis countries.
Furthermore, the authors provide statistically robust probit regressions showing that a ratio of
short-term foreign obligations/reserves in excess of one nearly triples the probability of a crisis in
their sample. It is important to recognize that Rodrik and Velasco define a crisis as a sudden
outflow of foreign capital greater than 5% of GDP. While in theory it is possible for such
outflows to occur in the absence of a twin episode, the authors point out that their criteria leads
to the inclusion of nearly all crises identified by studies which considered broader measures such
as currency depreciation and reserve depletion.
The Financial Accelerator
Both the fundamental and financial panic schools present clear views on the factors
which make developing economies vulnerable to crises, as well as on the catalysts which finally
set the crises off, but where the extant literature is lacking is in explaining the “small shock, large
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cycle”4 phenomenon which often characterizes twin episodes. As many twin crisis observers
recognize, events such as those in Southeast Asia during the 1990s defy conventional models in
that the severity of the incident tends to drastically exceed prediction. The question of why
seemingly insignificant stimuli can (in the spirit of the fundamental school) lead to widespread
deterioration in the real economy, or (in the spirit of the panic view) push an economy toward the
run equilibrium is thus critical in understanding the nature and development of twin crises.
Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1996) demonstrate how adverse shocks are multiplied
by credit markets, through an effect they term “the financial accelerator.” The authors begin
under the assumption that, as previous literature shows, financing is more costly for firms to
obtain externally rather than internally due to the agency costs of lending. Interest rates on
external finance are taken to be inversely proportional to a firm’s net worth, which Bernanke,
Gertler, and Gilchrist (1996) define as the “sum of its gross cash flows and net discounted
assets.” Furthermore, it is assumed that all lending must be collateralized, making net worth the
upper bound on potential indebtedness. From these assumptions, Bernanke, Gertler, and
Gilchrist (1996) make clear that a decline in either cash flows or asset value reduces net worth,
restricting available credit and raising premiums on any credit that is forthcoming. As a result,
investment falls, cash flows are reduced further, and a vicious cycle of continually tightened
credit conditions sets in. Bernanke and Gertler (1989) argue that the preceding dynamics are
possible on a macro level as well, with even a small economy-wide shock bringing about a
similar cycle of declining cash flow and investment.
The aggregate supply-aggregate demand graph below illustrates how the financial
accelerator can magnify shocks to an economy. Suppose that there is a productivity shock that

4

Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1996).
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causes the AS curve to shift upwards to AS1.5 The consequent decline in real output causes an
overall drop in the net worth of firms (given the national income accounting identity), leading
financial intermediaries to both scale-back credit and raise the cost of any they make available.
With credit now scarce, investment is curtailed, and the AD curve shifts downwards to AD1.
Output falls to Y2, at which point the net worth of firms is further reduced, generating even
tighter credit conditions which push aggregate demand to AD2. While the example provided
here assumes the vicious cycle ceases once output reaches Y3, the financial accelerator literature
is unclear on when exactly the economy stabilizes. In practice, countercyclical fiscal and
monetary policies would be the most obvious mechanisms used to stem a downward creditoutput spiral.

Another important consideration of the financial accelerator model as put forth by
Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1996) is the “flight to quality”, a process whereby lenders
restrict credit to at-risk borrowers, channeling it instead to safe alternatives. The shift towards
safer borrowers occurs during periods of economic stress, as enhanced bankruptcy risk increases

5

The example of a productivity shock is given by Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1996) in discussing the
macroeconomic features of the financial accelerator.
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the agency costs associated with lending to low net worth firms. Agency costs lie at the heart of
the financial accelerator, leading in adverse conditions to severe credit restriction for those who
require liquidity most. Rationing in the presence of agency costs has also been explored by
Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), who demonstrate the potential for interest rates to screen borrowers,
and Holmstron and Tirole (1997), who show that the costs of monitoring loans can cause
intermediaries to restrict credit to weaker borrowers.
The most notable exposition of financial accelerator phenomena in the twin crisis
literature is provided by Krugman (1999), who models a situation whereby high leverage,
particularly in foreign currency, creates a “feedback loop” between firms, credit markets, and the
exchange rate regime. Under Krugman’s formulation, expectations that borrowers lack
sufficient net worth generate credit tightening, which in turn promotes a depreciation in the real
exchange rate, setting off a chain of bankruptcies and validating the original decision to withhold
capital. Gertler, Gilchrist, and Natalucci (2007) also study balance sheet effects of this sort,
noting that interest rate hikes in defense of a peg serve to curtail investment and exacerbate
financial accelerator dynamics already underway. Furthermore, rising interest rates reduce the
present discounted value of firms’ assets, dragging down net worth, while at the same time
increasing their debt burdens, ultimately raising questions about solvency (Bernanke, Gertler,
and Gilchrist 1996; Furman et al. 1998). In both cases, the net effect is once again a flight to
quality and reduction in at-risk borrowers’ access to credit.
As a real world example of financial accelerator dynamics, one can look to the policies
enacted in response to the Asian crises of 1997-1998. Beginning with the devaluation of the
Thai baht in July 1997, a wave of panic spread over Southeast Asia, leading to successive attacks
against the Malaysian ringgit, Indonesian rupiah, Korean won, Philippine peso, and Hong Kong
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dollar. To counter the severe pressure mounting against these currencies, central banks rapidly
pushed up short-term interest rates. Interest rates were raised again following each country’s
eventual devaluation, a policy suggested, and later required, by the International Monetary Fund
as a means to stem inflation and any additional depreciation. Furman et al. (1998) argue that
these contractionary monetary policies not only constrained output, but acted to raise bankruptcy
risk among weak firms, reducing expected returns in the affected economies and prompting
additional capital flight. Radelet and Sachs (1998) further contend that the true effect of tight
monetary policy was not stabilization of exchange rates, which continued to fall, but rather a
substantial drop in output due to enhanced financial fragility. The authors point to a statement
from the IMF itself, which conceded that “the tightening of monetary conditions [in Indonesia]
transferred market pressures to the domestic economy, putting heavy strains on the already-weak
financial sector” (Radelet and Sachs 1998, p.65).
In the context of the Asian crisis, it is important to note that the initial tightening of credit
came not from the private sector, as occurs in Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist’s (1996) model,
but from direct monetary policy actions taken by the region’s respective central banks (at the
insistence of the IMF). Nonetheless, anecdotal evidence suggests that the consequent effects on
output and bankruptcy risk sparked the very processes predicted by financial accelerator models.
Stiglitz (2010) makes a similar contention, arguing that the pro-cyclical monetary and fiscal
policies which often accompany “Washington consensus” packages serve to magnify the size of
economic fluctuations. In this view, government programs and the financial accelerator exist in
a type of positive feedback loop, with successive drops in output prompting further monetary and
fiscal tightening and thus further credit scarcity. Additionally, to the extent that tight credit
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conditions not only reduce output, but also induce capital flight by signaling distress, the
financial accelerator is consistent in part with both the fundamental and financial panic schools.
While the analyses presented by Krugman (1999), Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist
(1996) and others view financial accelerator effects at the firm level, it is not difficult to extend
their ideas to international markets. If one takes the aggregate worth of a country (measured in
gross domestic product) to be analogous to firm net worth, then it becomes plausible to analyze
credit rationing and the flight to quality as a possible explanation for the rapid capital outflows
observed during twin crises. Agency costs are also likely to play a role in driving the flow of
international capital, as high-cost borrowers, primarily in emerging markets, are more susceptible
to the flight to quality. The financial accelerator theory can therefore prove useful in explaining
the exacerbation of shocks both within and between affected nations.

III: Conceptual Model
As both theory and historical experience show, rapid and severe capital outflows
constitute a central feature of twin crises. Such outflows typically take the form of runs, whether
on short-term debt, commercial banks, or foreign reserves held at the central bank, and in almost
all cases lead to a collapse of the financial system. Given the critical role of runs in causing twin
crises, this thesis proceeds with a conceptual framework that builds upon the short-term debt
model developed by Rodrik and Velasco (1999).
In the Rodrik and Velasco model, an investor is given k units in period 0 to invest in an
illiquid asset which returns R > 1 in period 2 and ρ < 1 if liquidated in period 1. It is assumed
that k is funded with some combination of short-term borrowing d and long-term borrowing
(𝑘 − 𝑑). Short-term debt matures in period 1, at which point holders of d, who operate under
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rational expectations, can either demand repayment or roll over into period 2. If all short-term
creditors seek repayment, the investor is forced to liquidate some amount of assets γ such that
𝑑

𝑑 = 𝜌𝛾. The total amount liquidated in the “run” scenario is therefore 𝛾 = (𝜌). Following
𝑑

liquidation, the investor’s period 2 wealth is R (𝑘 − 𝜌), while his period 2 debts are (𝑘 − 𝑑).
𝑑

Notice that if (𝑘 − 𝑑) > R (𝑘 − 𝜌), the investor lacks the funds in period 2 needed to meet his
outstanding obligations, making the run by short-term creditors entirely rational ex post.
Rearranging the preceding inequality, Rodrik and Velasco (1999) show that in order for a run on
short-term debt to be the rational choice of creditors, debt must meet the condition:
𝑅−1
𝑑>(
) 𝜌𝑘
𝑅−𝜌

(3.1)

In this form, the model can be easily adapted to encompass a holistic view of twin crises.
First, we see that higher levels of short-term debt make a country more prone to crisis by
requiring larger liquidations in the event of a run. As a result, it follows that policies which
encourage short-term debt accumulation necessarily increase crisis probability.6 Deposit
insurance, whether implicit or explicit, serves exactly this function, as it lowers banks’ shortterm funding costs by reducing the risk assumed by any individual creditor (Calvo 2000;
Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache 1998). So long as banks respond to a backstop by raising shortterm exposure, one would expect deposit insurance to be associated with a higher probability of
panic-driven liquidations. Yet while deposit insurance acts to increase crisis probability through
the short-term debt channel, it also helps to stem bank runs by guaranteeing investors a minimum

6

As will be shown below, short-term debt can in some cases reduce the likelihood of default by giving lenders
greater monitoring power.
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payout in all periods.7 At the international scale, however, deposit insurance often fails to
overcome widespread crises of confidence, possibly because inter-country information
asymmetries restore the uncertainty that insurance is designed to prevent. An international
lender of last resort may therefore prove necessary to maintain confidence in the global capital
markets, particularly if it can create needed foreign exchange rather than simply act as a fiscal
backstop (Fischer 1999).
Beyond deposit insurance, three other primary distortions play a role in pushing
borrowers toward short maturities. First, agents’ choice of maturity composition may be
constrained by what lenders are willing to provide. As demonstrated in Diamond and Dybvig
(1983), uncertainty surrounding consumption creates a demand among actors for highly liquid
deposits, the shortest liability held by the financial sector. Liquidity considerations are also
manifest in bank funding channels such as the overnight repurchase and interbank lending
markets. To the extent that highly-leveraged financial institutions have access primarily to shortterm instruments, liabilities are likely to reflect a short maturity structure. This concern is less
relevant to non-financial firms, which operate with significantly lower leverage. For these firms,
a more important distortion may come from the incentives faced by equity holders, who in
almost all cases control the enterprise as mangers. Diamond and He (2014) show that for
investment projects with constant volatility, the value of short-term debt rises less than the value
of long-term debt for any increase in firm value. That is, equity holders capture a greater share
of a rise in firm value when debt is primarily short-term, creating an incentive for managers to
contract shorter liabilities.

7

This function is a central implication of the Diamond-Dybvig (1983) model. One can interpret this result to mean
that deposit insurance removes some (if not all) uncertainty surrounding potential returns, and therefore helps to
achieve a Nash equilibrium where no single investor finds it optimal to run on the bank.
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A second phenomenon which may encourage short-term borrowing is moral hazard,
which alters the risk-reward calculus faced by both borrowers and creditors. From the
perspective of borrowers, the presence of a lender of last resort mitigates the risk of a liquidity
crunch in the financial sector, while the presence of a bailout-prone fiscal authority ensures that
early asset liquidation does not lead to bankruptcy. Both of these distortions can drive agents
toward the nominally cheapest form of debt available, which given an upward-sloping yield
curve is always short-term. As shown below, the result is reversed when borrowers internalize
maturity risk, in which case they optimally contract only long-term borrowing (Rodrik and
Velasco 1999). Creditors also receive security from real or potential bailouts, and as a result
become more willing to provide capital to fragile firms, especially financial institutions covered
by the lender of last resort (Radelet and Sachs 1998). Additionally, Demirgüç-Kunt and
Detragiache (1998) argue that deposit insurance may act as a source of moral hazard by inducing
banks to issue inherently riskier loans, as they can generate potentially higher returns without
assuming a commensurate amount of risk (because insurance effectively sets a floor on returns to
depositors). Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (1998) show behavior of this sort to be a robust
empirical indicator of banking crises.
Finally, Rodrik and Velasco (1999) note that the policies of private rating agencies can
impact the level of short-term debt held in an economy. As argued by Furman et al. (1998),
bond rating agencies often impose a “sovereign ceiling” on emerging markets, meaning no
individual borrower can carry a stronger rating than the central government. Such a practice
solves the problem of costly information acquisition for creditors by imposing a maximum rating
on the nation, but comes at the expense of distorted incentives for borrowers. Because higher
levels of short-term debt increase the economy-wide risk of self-fulfilling crises, firms that take
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on short-term liabilities impose an externality on all other agents (Rodrik and Velasco 1999). If
the credit ratings of individual firms were assigned independent of the central government, then
part of this externality would be internalized, as increased risk of a run would be manifest in a
weaker rating and thus higher cost of capital. Yet because stable borrowers with minimal shortterm exposure effectively face a limit on their credit rating, there is little incentive to improve
firm-level balance sheets beyond the binding constraint of the sovereign ceiling (Rodrik and
Velasco 1999).
While the above distortions encourage short-term borrowing, and thus raise the
probability of runs, Rodrik and Velasco (1999) show that short-term debt may in some cases
mitigate crises by preventing defaults. Rational creditors who believe that a borrower is
preparing to default have no choice but to run in period 1, forcing some costly liquidation. The
beliefs of creditors are in turn dependent on the incentives faced by debtors. For high levels of
short-term debt d, defaults are ruled out, as runs and the subsequent liquidation would leave the
borrower with little or no income in period 2. For extremely low levels of d, on the other hand,
liquidation is relatively small, and the costs low, making default the optimal choice. A sufficient
amount of short-term debt can therefore create an incentive for borrowers to avoid default,
leading to greater confidence from creditors and a resulting compression of risk premia.8
In addition to micro-level incentives, the experience of many economies in the 1980s and
1990s demonstrates that short-term debt accumulation is oftentimes associated on a macro scale
with periods of mass capital inflows. Financial liberalization plays a leading role in attracting so

8

Interest rates are endogenized below, but are assumed to be 0 here for the sake of illustrating the pre-commitment
function of short-term debt.
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called “hot money”, typically by curbing regulations and/or opening the capital account. 9 The
inflows that follow liberalization tend to take the form of short-term loans and deposits rather
than long-term investments such as FDI, causing a substantial rise the economy’s short-term
exposure. Goldfajn and Valdes (1997) show that financial deepening can also magnify the size
of inflows, as an expansion of banks’ intermediary function makes it both easier and cheaper for
foreign investors to access a country. From an empirical standpoint, the fact that inflows are
intermediated by the banking system suggests that variables such as the ratio of credit to GDP
should rise as capital enters the country. To the extent that such inflows are short-term in nature,
growth in the ratio of credit/GDP would push a country closer to the run condition given by
(3.1). The relationship between credit expansion and twin crises is demonstrated empirically by
Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999), who find that the ratio of domestic credit to GDP averages
roughly 20 in the months immediately preceding twin crises, compared to about 5 in normal
periods.
Hot money inflows are closely related to a country’s balance-of-payments position. Net
inflows signify that a country is spending beyond what it produces domestically (Calvo and
Reinhart 2000), borrowing from foreign investors in order finance a current account deficit.
Obstfeld (2012) notes that orthodox thought gives little concern to such deficits, as they in theory
represent a rational tradeoff between spending today and saving tomorrow. However, this
explanation ignores the important fact that persistent deficits encourage sustained short-term
liability accumulation, making countries prone to crises should inflows reverse. Because a
negative current account balance necessarily requires short-term foreign funding, large and

9

See Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999).
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persistent deficits are likely to be associated with increased vulnerability to capital flow
reversals.
Aside from introducing the possibility of runs, Rodrik and Velasco (1999) show that
higher levels of short-term debt have an important effect on the term structure of interest rates.
Investors operating with a degree of uncertainty focus not on nominal returns, but on expected
returns, giving some probability to default. So long as there is any risk associated investing in a
given country, this probability must be positive, and nominal returns must therefore be high
enough to equate expected values globally. Risk, in turn, is driven partially by a country’s level
of short-term debt and the looming specter of coordination failure. Given these relationships,
Rodrik and Velasco (1999) endogenize both short- and long-term interest rates for various levels
of d. If the probability of a run is given by p, and the probability of repayment following a run
given by qL, then the expected return to long-term creditors and those who roll over from period
1 is given by:
(1 − 𝑝)(1 + 𝑟𝐿 ) + 𝑝𝑞𝐿 (1 + 𝑟𝐿 ) = 1

(3.2)

Where rL is the interest rate on long-term debt. The authors note that for long-term debt to carry
any repayment risk, condition (3.1) must be satisfied, meaning rL will deviate from 0 only for
sufficiently high amounts of short-term borrowing. Rodrik and Velasco define the probability of
repayment, qL, as the ratio of period 2 income to claims, which following a run is given by:

𝑞𝐿 =

𝑑
𝑅 (𝑘 − 𝜌 )

(3.3)

(1 + 𝑟𝐿 )(𝑘 − 𝑑)
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Plugging (3.3) into (3.2) yields:

(1 − 𝑝)(1 + 𝑟𝐿 ) + 𝑝(1 + 𝑟𝐿 ) [

𝑑
𝑅 (𝑘 − 𝜌 )
(1 + 𝑟𝐿 )(𝑘 − 𝑑)

]=1

(3.4)

Which can be further simplified to:

(1 − 𝑝)(1 + 𝑟𝐿 ) +

𝑑
𝑝𝑅 (𝑘 − 𝜌 )

=1

(3.5)

𝑑
𝑝𝑅 (𝑘 − 𝜌 )

(3.6)

𝑘−𝑑

(1 − 𝑝)(1 + 𝑟𝐿 ) = 1 −

𝑘−𝑑

Giving the required return on long-term debt as:
𝑑
𝑝𝑅 (𝑘 − 𝜌 )
1
1 + 𝑟𝐿 =
[1 −
]
(1 − 𝑝)
𝑘−𝑑

(3.7)

Because ρ < 1, the interest rate on long-term debt is increasing in the level of short-term debt d.
As Rodrik and Velasco (1999) note, this holds because an increase in a borrower’s short-term
debt burden reduces the probability of long-term creditors being repaid.
The authors next go on to endogenize the short-term interest rate, which must be greater
than 0 if d > ρk and full repayment is impossible under a run. Again taking a probabilityweighted average to compute expected return, we have:
(1 − 𝑝)(1 + 𝑟𝑆 ) + 𝑝𝑞𝑆 (1 + 𝑟𝑆 ) = 1

(3.8)
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Where qS is the probability of period 1 repayment in the run and is equal to:

𝑞𝑆 =

𝜌𝑘
(1 + 𝑟𝑆 ) 𝑑

(3.9)

Plugging (3.9) into (3.8) gives the expected return on short-term debt as:

(1 − 𝑝)(1 + 𝑟𝑆 ) + 𝑝(1 + 𝑟𝑆 ) [

𝜌𝑘
]=1
(1 + 𝑟𝑆 ) 𝑑

(3.10)

(3.10) further simplifies to:
𝑝𝜌𝑘
=1
𝑑

(3.11)

𝑝𝜌𝑘
𝑑

(3.12)

1
𝑝𝜌𝑘
[1 −
]
(1 − 𝑝)
𝑑

(3.13)

(1 − 𝑝)(1 + 𝑟𝑆 ) +

(1 − 𝑝)(1 + 𝑟𝑆 ) = 1 −

Yielding the required return on short-term debt:

1 + 𝑟𝑆 =

Recall that rS > 0 only if d > ρk and short-term debt carries repayment risk. In the event
of a run, then, the investor is required to liquidate his entire portfolio, leaving no assets with
which to repay long-term creditors. Rodrik and Velasco show that in this case, the long-term
expected return is simply the inverse probability of no run occurring, or (1 – p)-1. Furthermore, if
𝑅−1

d > ρk, then it must also be true that 𝑑 > (𝑅−𝜌) 𝜌𝑘, so that the long-term interest rate is given by
(3.7). Thus, comparing (3.7) and (3.13) we see that, so long as (3.1) is satisfied, short-term debt
must always carry a lower interest rate than long-term debt. In other words, countries are subject
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to an upward-sloping yield curve. Yet while short-term debt is nominally cheaper than longterm borrowing, the Rodrik and Velasco (1999) model shows that interest rates, along with the
probability of a run, are increasing in d, so that an investor’s expected consumption is in fact
maximized when he takes on no short-term debt and d = 0. Despite d = 0 representing the
rational choice of investors, the aforementioned distortions repeatedly cause countries to expose
themselves to twin crises by relying on excessive amounts of short-term funding.
In addition to a country’s stock of short-term debt d, it is clear from (3.1) that the
probability of a run by creditors is also influenced by the return on domestic technology R.
Because capital is intermediated through the financial system, one can think of R as the return
generated by the banking sector’s collective assets, and k as the face value of those assets.
Changes in R, then, are represented by changes in the value of assets, such as loans, which in
turn are driven by the real economy. An exogenous decline in R between periods 0 and 1, due to
factors such as a sudden productivity shock, lowers expected period 2 income, moving a country
closer to the run condition. On the other hand, an exogenous rise in R makes it easier for the
nation to satisfy its period 2 obligations. Fluctuations in R also affect the interest rate charged on
long-term borrowing, with rates moving inversely with the domestic return on technology (as
shown by [3.7]). Such pro-cyclical movements of lending premia are consistent with the
financial accelerator model of Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1996). Importantly, these
developments are independent of d, indicating that crises are possible even in the presence of
relatively low levels of debt (so long as the fundamental breakdown is large enough). Variables
such as GDP growth and non-performing loan ratios should therefore be important in
determining both the timing and magnitude of capital outflows.
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This thesis further extends the Rodrik and Velasco model to allow for the inclusion of
financial accelerator dynamics. Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1996) argue that while lead-lag
complications make it difficult to assess the relationship between credit scarcity and output
empirically, the flight to quality is relatively easier to discern from data. The authors predict that
credit tightening will disproportionately affect fragile borrowers, with investors choosing in
times of stress to lend only to those with stable cash flows and large amounts of collateral. In the
context of this conceptual framework, the flight to quality would entail larger outflows for
nations with weak or deteriorating fundamentals, manifest in the return on domestic technology
R. While the criteria for classifying a borrower as weak is inexact, a potentially useful variable
through which to assess stability is the ratio of aggregate non-performing loans to assets.
Because financial intermediation makes Rk equivalent to period 2 income from loans, a higher
value of NPLs/assets necessarily means a lower value of Rk.10 For any decline in Rk, the
economy moves closer to satisfying (3.1), which if met leads to large capital outflows consistent
with the flight to quality. A shortcoming of this interpretation is that the flight to quality is
characterized not only by the flow of funds away from weak borrowers, but toward strong ones.
Yet so long as global financial institutions channel cash into securities (such as U.S. treasuries),
rather than simply parking it at the central bank, one can make the simplifying assumption that
capital outflows from weak countries are accompanied by inflows to healthier nations and firms.

IV: Empirical Model
The preceding section provides a conceptual framework in which to analyze the
underlying determinants of twin crises. In order to empirically test the theoretical predictions,

In practice, banks’ assets also consist of cash, bonds, and other securities, yet for sake of simplicity we assume
that all assets take the form of loans.
10
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this thesis applies a probit econometric model to a sample of 48 emerging economies covered by
the IMF International Financial Statistics in the 1980-2013 period. 1980 is chosen as the
starting point for the sample because it coincides with the beginning of a global push toward
financial liberalization, a phenomenon which is central in both the fundamental and financial
panic views of twin crises. Certain countries are excluded due to a lack of data availability.
Given that a large number of countries are analyzed across 34 annual periods, this thesis makes
use of a short panel. Figures are obtained primarily from World Bank and IMF databases, which
provide standardized presentations that improve the reliability of cross-country data.
The conceptual model developed in Section Three equates a crisis to a run on short-term
debt. At the macroeconomic scale, runs generate mass capital outflows from a given country,
and this thesis therefore follows Rodrik and Velasco (1999) in defining a crisis as a “sharp
reversal in capital flows” greater than 5% of gross domestic product.11 Capital flows are
measured using IMF data on the net financial account, which excludes transactions that are
undertaken between nations’ respective monetary and fiscal authorities in order to satisfy
balance-of-payments issues. When the decline in capital inflows to a country between year t-1
and t exceeds 5% of nominal GDP, the dummy dependent variable Ct takes on a value of 1,
whereas in all other cases Ct = 0. Following Rodrik and Velasco (1999) and Radelet and Sachs
(1998), countries are excluded from the analysis for two years following a crisis in order to avoid
registering a single, multi-year episode as numerous crises. While seemingly arbitrary, the 5%
threshold allows for objective identification of crises over a large sample of countries. With the
notable exception of Mexico in 1994, this strategy identifies nearly all episodes which have been
considered by more subjective analyses, consistent with Rodrik and Velasco (1999).

11

Because the 5% threshold is chosen somewhat arbitrarily, we also present results at the 4% and 3% thresholds.
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Because we are interested in the underlying determinants of twin crises, this thesis uses a
probit model to analyze the effect of explanatory variables on crisis probability. If the crisis
dependent variable is represented by Ct, then the probit model takes the form12:
𝑃(𝐶𝑡 = 1) = 𝐺(𝛽0 + 𝑥𝛽)

(4.1)

where xβ is a vector of explanatory variables. G represents the standard normal cumulative
distribution function (cdf), which is given by:
𝛽0 +𝑥𝛽

𝐺(𝛽0 + 𝑥𝛽) = ∫
−∞

1 (−𝑧 2 )
𝑒 2 d𝑧
2𝜋

(4.2)

for all real numbers z (Wooldridge 2009). Substituting our variables of interest into (4.1) yields
the following equation to be estimated:
𝑃(𝐶𝑡 = 1) = 𝐺(𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑆𝑇𝐷𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝐷𝑆𝑇𝐷𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝐵𝑀𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4 𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡

(4.3)

+ 𝛽5 𝐶𝑅𝐸𝐷𝐼𝑇𝐺𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐺𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7 𝑅𝐸𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8 𝐶𝐴𝐷𝑖𝑡 )
where STDR measures short-term debt as a percentage of total reserves; DSTDR is a dummy
variable that takes on a value of 1 if the ratio of short-term debt to total reserves exceeds 1 in
year t, and 0 otherwise; BMR measures the ratio of broad money to total reserves; DI is a dummy
variable that takes a value of 1 if an explicit deposit insurance scheme is in place in year t, and 0
otherwise; CREDITGR measures the percentage growth in the ratio of domestic credit to nominal
GDP over the preceding four years; GDPGR measures the percentage growth in real GDP over
the preceding four years; RER measures the percentage change in the real exchange rate over the
preceding four years; and CAD measures the current account deficit as a percentage of GDP.
Various lags of these variables are tested, and each is explained in further detail below.

12

Wooldridge (2009).
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The probit model estimated in this thesis has a few key features which make it preferable
to a simple linear probability model. First, linear probability models do not constrain the fitted
dependent variable to values between 0 and 1, meaning estimation can yield “probabilities”
which are uninformative from a practical standpoint. Probit models solve this problem by
limiting the cdf to values strictly between 0 and 1 (Wooldridge 2009, p.576). Second, linear
probability models take the marginal effect of an explanatory variable as constant, which in this
context would amount to treating marginal effects the same for all countries regardless of their
initial crisis probability. With a probit model, however, one must multiply an estimated
coefficient by the derivative of the cdf with respect to that coefficient in order to obtain a
marginal effect (Wooldridge 2009, p.577). The marginal effect of a given explanatory variable
is therefore small for countries with very high or low initial probabilities, as the slope of the cdf
for these countries is relatively flat (Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache 1998).
While the non-linear nature of probit models carries the above advantages, it also
necessitates the use of estimation methods other than ordinary least squares. This thesis
therefore follows standard practice in estimating (4.3) using maximum likelihood estimation
(MLE). Rather than minimizing the sum of the squared residuals, MLE maximizes the loglikelihood of a dependent variable y conditional on a vector of explanatory variables xβ. The
log-likelihood of y is in turn derived from the log of the standard normal cdf given by (4.2).
Wooldridge (2009) notes that in the absence of specification error, the MLE estimate of a given
β is both consistent and asymptotically efficient.
When estimating binary response models such as the probit, panel data present unique
challenges in obtaining consistent, unbiased estimates. Among these, most pressing is the
potential for heterogeneity among cross-sectional units, as variables not represented in the
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estimated equation may differentially impact countries across time (Demirgüç-Kunt and
Detragiache 1998). Practitioners working with panel data often address heterogeneity by
including fixed effects in the estimated equation, which ascribe a unique intercept to each unit.
Yet because each unit N receives its own intercept, the number of parameters in the equation
increases as N approaches ∞. Holding the number of periods T constant, this prevents any given
𝛽̂
𝑖𝑡 from converging to its actual value, creating what is known as the “incidental parameters
problem” (Arellano and Hahn 2005). For linear models, the incidental parameters problem is
solved by removing the unobserved effect through a series of transformations (Wooldridge 2010,
p.302). However, the use of MLE with probit models prevents such transformations, ruling out
fixed effects as a solution to heterogeneity.
A second approach to dealing with heterogeneity in probit models is to assume random
effects, which are drawn from a probability distribution rather than fixed at a specific value over
time. In order for a random effects probit to produce consistent, unbiased estimates, one must
assume that the random effects are both uncorrelated with the explanatory variables and follow a
normal distribution with mean 0 and constant variance (Wooldridge 2010, p.612). DemirgüçKunt and Detragiache (1998) argue that the strong assumption of independence is unlikely to
hold in practice, introducing bias to the estimated coefficients. Due to the limitations of both
fixed and random effects models, this thesis proceeds to estimate (4.3) while remaining
cognizant of the potential for cross-sectional and time-variant heterogeneity. We are cautiously
optimistic that the estimated equation captures the underlying drivers of twin crises, and
therefore do not believe that our results are meaningfully impacted by unobserved effects.
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Description of Explanatory Variables
The explanatory variables included in equation (4.3) are chosen to reflect both prevailing
theory and the conceptual model developed in Section Three. STDR, the stock of short-term debt
as a percentage of total reserves, captures the important role that short-term liabilities play in
exposing countries to runs on the banking system and exchange rate regime. Our conceptual
model demonstrates that, ceteris paribus, higher levels of short-term debt make capital flight
more likely, and STDR is therefore presented as a continuous variable with a positive expected
sign. Short-term debt is analyzed relative to reserves because a central bank’s ability to defend
an exchange rate peg, and thus prevent a twin crisis, is ultimately predicated on the stock of
foreign reserves at its disposal. So long as reserves exceed the value of short-term liabilities that
can be run-on, the exchange rate is in theory insulated from wider financial sector issues.13 This
thesis therefore includes a dummy variable, DSTDR, that takes on a value of 1 when short-term
debt exceeds total reserves and 0 otherwise, following Rodrik and Velasco (1999). Short-term
debt includes both private and government obligations in recognition of the influence public
indebtedness can have on precipitating crises, such as in many Latin American countries during
the early 1980s.
As a second gauge of international illiquidity, this thesis introduces a variable BMR that
measures the ratio of broad money to total reserves. Chang and Velasco (2000) argue that broad
money should serve as the true gauge of a country’s international exposure due to the
relationship between bank runs, capital flight, and the ensuing conversion of domestic into
foreign currency. So long as countries permit free convertibility, all broad money is in essence a

13

In practice, central banks will often abandon a peg well before depleting all reserves, increasing the practical
relevance of the continuous variable STDR. This phenomenon is stressed by Krugman (1979) in his first generation
model.
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short-term foreign liability, reconciling the BMR variable with our conceptual model. Previous
analyses have examined the ratio of M2 to foreign reserves, yet the restriction of the money
supply to M2 misses financial instruments such as bank commercial paper and certificates of
deposit which can, and often are, run on in the event of a twin crisis. This concern is particularly
relevant to more recent episodes such as the global financial crisis of 2008, wherein investors
sold off all but the safest short-term assets en masse. A potential limitation to this variable is
that, for countries with relatively underdeveloped financial markets, a lack of liquidity can
eliminate the money-like qualities of certain assets classified as broad money. We expect the
sign of BMR to be positive, as higher levels of broad money relative to reserves both increase the
likelihood of runs and reduce the ability of a central bank to defend its exchange rate.
While the ratio of broad money to reserves is a theoretically important determinant of
crisis vulnerability, measurement can encounter an endogeneity problem. As crises unfold and
the financial sector comes under pressure, central banks often extend large amounts of liquidity
to troubled institutions, an action that significantly expands the domestic money supply.
Because the stock of broad money is measured at the end of year t, monetary easing that takes
place throughout the year will artificially inflate the measured total. This sequence can also
occur when central banks seek to preempt crises by undertaking easy money policies in the face
of weakening fundamentals. Our approach of excluding countries from the panel for two years
following a crisis, inspired by Radelet and Sachs (1998) and Rodrik and Velasco (1999),
partially addresses this problem by avoiding measurement of the monetary easing that in many
cases follows twin episodes.
A deposit insurance dummy variable, DI, is introduced in order to capture the effects of
moral hazard. As discussed in Section Three, insurance schemes can encourage banks to take

33

large risks by guarding their depositors against potential losses, implying a positive relationship
between deposit insurance and the probability of a crisis. However, the well-known role of
deposit insurance as a “circuit breaker” during bank runs suggests that the relationship between
insurance schemes and crises may in fact be negative. As a result, the expected sign of the DI
variable is ambiguous, in line with Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (1998).
Data for the DI variable come from work done by Demirgüç-Kunt, Kane, and Laeven
(2013), who compile a database covering all IMF members and affiliated countries. A potential
shortcoming of this database is that, while it covers explicit insurance arrangements, it does not
account for implicit programs due to the inherent difficulty in identifying such schemes. Yet as
the recurrence of government-assisted sales and bailouts of financial institutions demonstrates,
most monetary and fiscal authorities stand ready to protect depositors and other creditors during
times of stress. To the extent that market participants expect such actions, moral hazard is likely
to come from other sources in addition to explicit deposit insurance programs.
This thesis introduces a variable measuring the growth in domestic credit relative to
GDP, CREDITGR, as proxy for asset quality within the financial system. Asset quality is
perhaps the strongest gauge of an economy’s underlying health, as it provides a direct indicator
of financial stability and indirect measure of real economic performance. The analysis in Section
Three shows that a deterioration in asset quality can generate runs in the style of Diamond and
Dybvig (1983), a flight to quality as in Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1996), and increased
premia on both government and private debt, each of which contribute to the onset of twin crises.
Yet while asset quality, manifest in the stock of non-performing loans, is clearly a variable of
interest, measurement is made difficult by the tendency of banks to avoid classifying loans as
non-performing during the boom that typically precedes a bust (Radelet and Sachs 1998).
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Problems also arise when comparing NPL data across countries with radically different
regulatory and reporting structures. For example, Chiuri, Ferri, and Majnoni (2001) document a
wide variation in both degree and timing in the implementation of reporting standards throughout
much of the developing world during the 1990s.
Gavin and Hausmann (1996) convincingly argue that the above issues can be avoided
through the use of growth in domestic credit as a proxy for asset quality. The authors’
contention is that banks hoping to rapidly grow their lending portfolios have no choice but to
extend credit to borrowers and projects for which information is scarce, and it is through the
blind provision of funds that asset quality begins to decline. Gavin and Hausmann’s story
appears prescient in light of the lending booms that preceded economic collapse in the United
States, Ireland, and other nations during the global financial crisis of 2008. To capture a lending
boom of this sort, this thesis uses data on the ratio of domestic credit to GDP provided by the
World Bank. The percentage change in this ratio is then computed between year t-3 and t. We
expect the sign of CREDITGR to be positive given the relationship between lending booms and
twin crises.
The final three variables in equation (4.3) capture traditional, macro-driven explanations
of twin crises. GDPGR measures the growth in real GDP over the preceding four years. As is
the case with non-performing loan ratios, GDP growth serves as an indicator of an economy’s
underlying health and thus impacts the probability of runs and the flight to quality. Because low
or negative growth signals fundamental weakness, we would expect GDPGR to register with a
negative sign. It is important to note that interpretation of this variable may be clouded by the
effects of financial asset bubbles, as bubbles tend to increase both growth and crisis
vulnerability, implying a positive coefficient for GDPGR.
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RER represents the percentage change in the real effective exchange rate over the
preceding four years, following Radelet and Sachs (1998). The real effective exchange rate is
calculated by Darvas (2012) as a country’s year-average nominal exchange rate with respect to a
weighted basket of 67 trading partners, indexed to 2007, divided by an identically-weighted
consumer price index deflator. A higher value of RER indicates appreciation, while a lower
value indicates depreciation. Significant appreciation hurts the real economy by raising the price
of a country’s exports, and may also stoke fears of a future devaluation, giving rise to a
speculative attack à la Krugman (1979). On the other hand, depreciation places a burden on
banks and firms holding large amounts of foreign-denominated debt. Given these competing
dynamics, the expected sign of RER is ambiguous.
CAD measures a country’s current account deficit in year t as a percentage of nominal
GDP. Large current account deficits are made possible only by matching capital account
surpluses, which in turn rely on the investment community’s collective beliefs regarding the
sustainability of a country’s balance-of-payments position. Any development that triggers a loss
of confidence in current account sustainability will send capital rushing for the exits, setting off a
traditional balance-of-payments crisis and placing downward pressure on the exchange rate. The
larger a country’s current account deficit, the larger an eventual devaluation must be in order to
restore balance. CAD is therefore expected to register with a positive sign, as higher values
imply a larger deficit. From a theoretical perspective, there exists potential multicollinearity
between the CAD and RER variables, as current account deficits are often exacerbated by an
overvalued real exchange rate. However, the correlation matrix presented in Appendix Two
indicates that correlation between these two variables is low, and multicollinearity is therefore of
little concern.
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V: Results
To determine the appropriate specification of equation (4.3), various models were
estimated and compared on the basis of the Akaike information criterion (AIC) and BayesSchwarz information criterion (BIC). The results of these tests are reported in Appendix Two.
Both the AIC and BIC measure goodness of fit by adjusting the estimated log-likelihood for
degrees of freedom, with lower values signifying “better” models (Demirgüç-Kunt and
Detragiache 1998). Originally proposed by Akaike (1974), AIC adjusts the estimated loglikelihood by the number of included parameters (Amemiya 1981). BIC not only penalizes
models for the number of parameters, but also for sample size, and therefore provides a more
conservative benchmark by which to assess model quality (Schwarz 1978). Both AIC and BIC
are lowest when three fundamental variables, CREDITGR, GDPGR, and RER, are lagged two
years, while all other variables are lagged by one. This result is unsurprising from a theoretical
standpoint, as fundamental factors typically require a delay to work through balance sheets in the
build-up to twin episodes. Given the above analysis, all results presented hereafter are variations
of the specification where CREDITGR, GDPGR, and RER are lagged two years.
Table 1 reports the results of our primary probit regressions. In both specifications where
it is included as a continuous variable, short-term debt as a percentage of total reserves enters
with a statistically significant, positive coefficient. Furthermore, short-term debt averages
roughly 115% of total reserves in countries that experience crises, compared to only 93% in noncrisis countries. Yet while the coefficient on STDR is highly significant, its marginal effect is
surprisingly small. For a one unit increase in short-term debt as a percentage of total reserves,
the probability of a twin crisis increases by only 0.01%. Put differently, a doubling of short-term
debt from 100% to 200% of reserves is associated with only a 1 percentage point increase in
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crisis probability. This suggests that short-term debt is most meaningful in situations where
exposure is exceptionally high, such as during Brazil’s 1983 episode, wherein short-term debt
stood at 437% of nominal GDP in the year preceding the crisis. Confirming this interpretation,
the DSTDR variable shows no significant relationship between short-term debt/reserve ratios in
excess of one and the probability of twin crises.
Fundamental factors appear to have a much stronger effect on the probability of twin
crises. In the best-fitting model, shown in column two of Table 1, credit growth and a current
account deficit are strongly associated with greater vulnerability. Current account deficits are
highly significant at the 1% level, with a one percentage point increase in the deficit as a
percentage of GDP leading to a 0.6 percentage point increase in crisis probability. Figure 4
below further shows that, holding all other variables at their mean, a reduction of the current
account deficit from 20% to 0% of GDP lowers predicted crisis probability from roughly 23% to
7%. CAD remains significant at the 1% level in each specification of the model, demonstrating a
statistically robust relationship between the current account and exposure to crises.

Figure 2: Emerging Market Crises by Year
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Note: Crisis defined as a reversal in capital flows between year t-1 and t greater than 5% of nominal GDP. Countries
are excluded from the panel for two years following a crisis.
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The coefficient on CREDITGR is significant at the 5% level. For a one unit increase in
total growth, crisis probability increases by roughly 0.02 percentage points. Because the
CREDITGR variable itself measures the percentage change in credit between period t and t-3, a
two year lag captures the effect of a “lending boom” that begins six years before the onset of a
crisis. While the effect of credit growth on crises appears small, it is important to note that this
result describes a general rather than specific relationship. In their seminal work on financial
crises, Kindleberger and Aliber (2011) document a historically consistent relationship between
financial innovations, such as the creation of asset-backed securities, and credit-fueled financial
crises. Kindleberger and Aliber’s work ultimately suggests that the strongest effects of credit
expansion may be reserved for highly specific, idiosyncratic episodes.
Figure 3: Crisis vs. Non-Crisis Means
30%
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Credit growth

GDP growth
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-5%
Non -crisis

Current account
deficit

Crisis

Note: Credit growth, GDP growth, and RER appreciation all measured over the four years preceding
crisis, and each is lagged by two years.

There is also some evidence that real exchange rate appreciation is associated with twin
crises. In the model where the ratio of total external debt to GDP is controlled for, the
coefficient on RER enters with a positive sign and is significant at the 10% level. For this
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specification, a one percentage point appreciation of the real exchange rate over the previous
four years is associated with a 0.06 percentage point increase in the probability of a crisis. The
real exchange rate is also significant at the 10% level when the continuous short-term
debt/reserves variable is replaced with a dummy variable representing short-term debt/reserve
ratios in excess of one. However, once external debt/GDP is excluded from the model with
STDR, improving overall fit, the real exchange rate becomes insignificant. The seeming lack of
robustness observed for RER is potentially due to our conjecture that both appreciation and
depreciation contribute to crises, requiring a two-tailed hypothesis test. Were one to hypothesize
that only appreciation is associated with twin crises, then the real exchange rate is significant at
the 10% level in both specifications.
Figure 4: Effect of Current Account Deficit on Crisis
Probability
Predicted crisis probability
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Note: Predicted probabilities calculated holding all other independent variables at their means.

Surprisingly, an increase in the ratio of broad money to total reserves is found to have a
highly significant negative effect on crisis probability. Both previous empirical work and the
conceptual model outlined in Section Three indicate that the relationship between broad money
and crises should in fact be positive, placing our result at odds with the wider literature.
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However, it is interesting to note that Rodrik and Velasco (1999), on whose work this analysis
draws heavily, also obtain a negative sign for their money supply variable. Whether this is due to
a shared feature of empirical design or methodology is unclear. One potential explanation is that
measurement of broad money suffers from a substantial endogeneity problem. If prescient
central banks are able to detect underlying weakness in their respective economies, then they are
likely to engage in monetary easing as a means of “heading-off” future episodes. To the extent
that such actions are successful, this story is consistent with an observation that the ratio of broad
money to reserves tends to be higher in non-crisis countries. Additionally, the unprecedented
monetary easing which has taken place over the past decade is likely to have inflated broad
money values relative to previous periods.
Table 1 shows no significant relationship between deposit insurance and twin crises.
Sections Three and Four above note that hypotheses on the role of deposit insurance are made
difficult by the competing dynamics of moral hazard, to which explicit schemes are a
contributor, and bank runs, which insurance programs help prevent. Whether moral hazard or
run-breaking prevails is dependent not only on the specific micro, macro, and political
characteristics of individual countries, but also on the behavior of agents involved in the banking
and bank-run processes. For a useful discussion of these dynamics, see Anginer, DemirgüçKunt, and Zhu (2014).
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Table 1: Probit Regressions
Dependent variable = 1 when reversal of capital inflows exceeds 5% of GDP
(1)
Dummy variable for short-term debt >
reservest-1

(2)

(3)

0.0001
(0.0003)

Short-term debt as a percentage of reservest-1

0.0001***
(0.0003)

0.0001**
(0.0004)

Broad money/reservest-1

-0.002
(0.012)

-0.005
(0.014)

-0.005
(0.014)

Explicit deposit insurance dummyt-1

-0.010
(0.122)

-0.011
(0.123)

-0.011
(0.123)

4 year % change in creditt-2

0.0002**
(0.051)

0.0002**
(0.051)

0.0002**
(0.051)

4 year % change in real GDPt-2

0.0003
(0.501)

0.0006
(0.498)

0.0006
(0.521)

4 year % change in real exchange ratet-2

0.0006*
(0.190)

0.0006
(0.188)

0.0006*
(0.190)

0.006***

0.006***

0.006***

(0.007)

(0.007)

(0.007)

Current account deficit as a percentage of
GDPt-1
Total external debt/GDPt-1

0.011
(0.1987)

Akaike information criterion
Bayes-Schwarz information criterion
Count R-squared

744.4
785.2
0.903

738.2
779.0
0.903

739.8
785.7
0.903

Total number of observations

1211

1211

1210

Coefficients represent the effect on crisis probability of a one unit increase in the explanatory variable,
holding all other variables at their mean. Standard errors are in parentheses. Model estimated using
maximum likelihood estimation. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels,
respectively.
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Finally, we find no significant link between real GDP growth and twin crises. While the
conceptual model of Section Three suggests that slowing growth might signal underlying
weakness, there remains the important caveat that sustained, positive growth can generate
fragility if driven a speculative bubble.14 On the basis of stylized facts, this contradiction
appears true for the global episode of 2008-2010, during which 18.6% of crises in our sample
occur. In the four year period from 2004 to 2007, total real GDP growth averages 18.2%,
compared to only 13.5% in the full panel. While the 2008-2010 example is not representative of
a larger population relationship, it nonetheless illustrates the potentially confounding effect that
bubbles may have on an analysis of GDP growth and its role in stimulating crises.
The above results should be interpreted with caution, as the estimated coefficients are
potentially subject to omitted variable bias due to both cross-sectional and time-variant
heterogeneity. Because fixed effects are infeasible and random effects require unnecessarily
strong assumptions, there is no standardized method for dealing with heterogeneity in probit
models. One crude option is to group countries based on shared characteristics, which helps to
account for any idiosyncrasies associated with that commonly-shared trait. Following this
approach, we place countries into one of five geographic regions and one of two income groups,
estimating the model for each separately.15 The results of this exercise are reported in Appendix
Two. Current account deficits are strongly associated with crisis probability in nearly every
subsample, save for the Middle East and North Africa country group, which represents only 120
of 1,211 observations. Results for the remaining groups are inconclusive, likely because these

14

I am grateful to Professor Miguel Ramirez for raising this important issue.
Turkey is excluded from this analysis given that it is the only country in the sample that hails from the Europe and
Central Asia group. I am grateful to Professor Nichole Szembrot for suggesting this approach.
15
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subsamples represent only a small piece of the overall panel. Analysis of this sort suffers from
its own problems, particularly small sample issues, and so too should be interpreted cautiously.
As a final test of model quality, the explanatory variables discussed above are regressed
against a crisis dependent variable that takes on a value of 1 when the reversal in capital flows
exceeds 4% and 3% of nominal GDP, respectively. Our results overwhelmingly remain robust to
various crisis thresholds. However, the credit growth variable becomes insignificant and takes
on a negative sign once the threshold is dropped to 4%, and registers a similar result for 3%.
Credit growth may suffer from the fact that, while the other explanatory variables (save for
deposit insurance) are theoretically associated with both banking and balance of payments issues,
lending booms act on crises primarily through the banking channel. It thus may be the case that
outflow thresholds of 3% and 4% capture episodes that occur even in the presence of a relatively
healthy banking sector, which would likely render credit growth insignificant. Putting aside the
issues associated with credit growth, our results remain robust to various specifications of the
model and thresholds for the dependent variable.
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Table 2: Summary Statistics for Selected Crises, 1980-2013
Country

Year

Short-term
debt/reserves

RER appreciation

Credit growth

Current account
deficit/GDP

Chile
Mexico
Brazil
Argentina
Egypt
Turkey
Venezuela
Thailand
Philippines
Indonesia
Zambia
Argentina
Ghana
Jamaica
Senegal
Argentina
Jamaica
Senegal
Botswana

1982
1982
1983
1989
1990
1994
1994
1997
1997
1997
1997
2001
2002
2002
2006
2008
2009
2010
2013

111.1%
502.5
437.4
110.9
316.0
236.2
34.2
123.5
67.7
166.2
214.0
112.6
122.0
49.0
3.0
41.6
71.0
0.0
5.0

-6.0%
25.1
4.0
-19.7
22.3
8.7
13.0
2.0
9.2
3.6
11.2
6.4
-30.7
-1.6
6.6
3.0
4.8
10.3
3.5

7.8%
-8.6
-51.2
-37.6
64.7
18.9
-3.7
35.5
162.7
2.4
24.5
54.0
3.6
-7.7
-45.5
-8.8
23.6
-157.1

14.5%
6.5
8.9
1.3
3.3
3.6
3.4
8.0
4.8
3.4
6.1
3.2
8.0
8.4
7.8
-2.6
20.4
6.7
1.1

115.3%

4.7%

25.1%

7.7%

Full sample mean

Note: See Appendix for data sources and calculations. Short term debt and the current account balance are
lagged by one year, while real exchange rate appreciation and credit growth are lagged by two. Real exchange
rate appreciation and credit growth represent the percentage change between year t-5 and t-2. Increases in the
real exchange rate indicate appreciation, while decreases indicate depreciation; see text for definition of real
effective exchange rate.
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Table 3: Crises By Country, 1980-2013
Country

Crises

Argentina
1989, 2001, 2008
Belize
1994, 2004, 2010
Bolivia
1980, 1985, 2003, 2006
Brazil
1983
Botswana
1987, 1993, 2010, 2013
Chile
1982, 1991, 1995, 1998, 2009
China
Colombia
Costa Rica
1981, 2009
Dominica
1983, 1993, 1996, 2001, 2006, 2013
Dominican Republic
2002
Ecuador
1983, 1999
Egypt
1987, 1990, 2006, 2011
Fiji
1989, 1999, 2008
Ghana
2002
Grenada
1983, 1988, 1999, 2010
Guatemala
1980, 2004
Honduras
2006, 2009
Indonesia
1997
India
Jamaica
1983, 1986, 2002, 2009, 2012
Jordan
1984, 1992, 1998, 2001, 2010
St. Lucia
1982, 1993, 2009, 2013
Sri Lanka
Lesotho
1999, 2010
Morocco
1995
Maldives
1982, 1985, 1994, 2001, 2012
Mexico
1982
Mauritius
1981, 2001
Malaysia
1987, 1994, 1997, 2005, 2012
Nigeria
1984, 1999, 2010
Pakistan
1998
Panama
1980, 1983, 2000, 2006, 2009
Peru
1983, 1998, 2013
Philippines
1983, 1997
Papua New Guinea
1983, 1992, 2000, 2008
Paraguay
1985, 1988, 1996, 1999
Senegal
1982, 2006, 2010
El Salvador
2004, 2009
Swaziland
1980, 1984, 1987, 1999, 2010
Thailand
1997, 2009
Tunisia
Turkey
1994, 2001
St. Vincent and the Grenadines 1981, 1988, 1993, 1999, 2002, 2011
Venezuela
1980, 1994
Vanuatu
1988, 1991, 1994, 1997, 2000, 2011
Samoa
1994
Zambia
1982, 1986, 1990, 1997, 2004, 2009
Note: Crisis defined as a reversal of capital flows between year t-1 and t greater than 5% of GDP. Countries are excluded from
the panel for two years after registering a crisis.
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VI: Discussion and Policy Implications
Discussion of Results
Current account deficits act as a robust driver of crisis vulnerability, with exposure to
twin episodes increasing in the overall deficit relative to GDP. The current account maintains
significance in nearly all geographic and income subsamples, confirming that it is not strongly
influenced by unobserved effects. Higher levels of short-term debt relative to reserves also
appear to increase vulnerability, although the marginal effect of a change in this ratio is small.
Finally, there is some weak evidence that real exchange rate appreciation is associated with the
onset of twin crises.
Taken in sum, our results suggest that crises cannot be rigidly classified into the
“fundamental” or “financial panic” explanations commonly found in the literature. Rather, the
broader story underlying twin crises is one of fragility, with surges in capital inflows and shortterm credit sustaining nations until the day investors’ focus shifts elsewhere, at which point
flows reverse and the boom becomes a bust. Importantly, the boom-bust cycle needn’t be the
exclusive result of either a self-fulfilling panic or fundamental collapse. Given our finding that
current account deficits are a strong indicator of vulnerability, the general outline of a crisis can
be interpreted as follows:
Liberalization and other reforms attract huge flows of capital into emerging economies, a
large portion of which reflect a short maturity structure. These flows are used to finance
domestic investment and consumption in excess of GNP, leading a large and growing current
account deficit (Calvo and Reinhart 2000). In many cases, an overvalued real exchange rate
magnifies the extent of the deficit by making imports cheaper and exports less competitive. So
long as the flow of capital continues, this process can go on indefinitely. At a certain point,
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however, investors deem the country unworthy, and the inflows quickly reverse.16 Shifts of this
sort can be traced to either a loss of confidence in the country’s BOP sustainability, an
international shock which draws capital elsewhere, or self-fulfilling dynamics such as those
described by Marshall (1999) and Goldfajn and Valdes (1997). A reversal of capital flows
places immense pressure on the exchange rate system, forcing the central bank to either deplete
reserves or devalue. At the same time, the run on the country drains assets from domestic banks
and limits the ability of financial institutions to access much needed liquidity. Banks begin to
fail, and thus, a twin crisis is born.
At the heart of this story is the role of external financing. Owing to both the inadequacy
of domestic markets and the enthusiasm of global investors, emerging economies rely heavily on
foreign capital to fund consumption and investment. Developed countries such as the United
States engage in this practice as well, yet do so in their own currency and at significantly more
favorable terms. For emerging economies, external capital acts as a key source of growth
financing when a nation is unable to mobilize savings domestically, and in this sense serves an
important function in the development process. Yet a dependence on foreign capital represents a
double-edged sword, for just as it drives growth during good times, it engenders fragility that can
be crippling during bad times. This is particularly true when domestic financial institutions,
which serve a critical intermediary role during the boom period, operate with a severe currency
and maturity mismatch. The very fact that emerging economies rely on funds from abroad, and
that these funds are prone to sharp reversals, is precisely what distinguishes twin crises in
developing nations from isolated, domestically-oriented episodes in wealthier countries.

16

Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) draw on a well-versed quote from Calvo (1998), who states this phenomenon by
noting: “If investors deem you unworthy, no funds will be forthcoming, and, thus, unworthy you will be.”
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Banking and currency crises are intimately linked by a rapid shift in capital flows, and this link is
made possible only by an acceptance of such flows in the first place.
As the econometric results presented above indicate, a foreign funding binge and ensuing
crisis vulnerability are most commonly reflected in an ever widening current account deficit. It
is curious, then, why highly-developed nations such as the United States are able to sustain a
negative current account balance indefinitely, while poorer nations are subject to painful
oscillations between deficit and surplus. One answer lies in the fact that, while developed
nations borrow in their own currency, emerging nations are often forced to borrow in reserve
currencies such as the euro or U.S dollar, meaning that expectations of a future devaluation can
trigger a run on debt that brings about a contraction in the current account position (Sachs,
Tornell, and Velasco 1998). This phenomenon is referred to by Eichengreen, Hausmann, and
Panizza (2003) as the “original sin” of emerging economies. In addition to currency
mismatching, emerging economies are distinguished from developed nations by the high agency
costs they face in borrowing. Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1996) argue that external finance
is likely to dry up in times of stress for those borrowers subject to high agency costs, as capital
holders “fly to quality.” Strong, low-cost borrowers avoid this turnaround in capital, as lenders
prefer to fund enterprises with stable balance sheets. In the context of twin crises, emerging
economies represent high-agency-cost borrowers, and thus are subject to the flight to quality
when fundamentals or confidence deteriorate.
Policy Implications
With a clearer understanding of the factors that make countries vulnerable to twin crises,
an appropriate next step is to examine what might be done to prevent them. Here it is important
to note that no single policy or policy package can entirely rule out crises, as there forever
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remains the potential for upper- and lower-tail events to knock an economy off course. Yet
because our empirical results show the change in crisis probability for a one unit change in a
given explanatory variable, they point toward measures which can reduce a country’s ultimate
exposure. In particular, three closely-linked policy implications emerge from our analysis: the
need to reduce agency costs of borrowing, the need to ensure stability in the current account
position, and the need to control the flow of international capital. We analyze each of these
proposals in turn.
Limiting Agency Costs and Uncertainty
Agency costs of borrowing play a critical role in driving capital outflows, and a first-best
policy for limiting crisis vulnerability centers on reducing these costs through institutional
upgrading. For emerging economies, the existence of high agency costs and uncertainty relative
to developed nations owes to a host of factors, chief among them a lack of transparency in data
reporting, poor regulation and supervision of the financial system, macroeconomic risks such as
persistent inflation, and political instability. Each of these stems from a common source, namely
a weak institutional environment. Even in countries where institutions are considered strong,
such as South Korea and Malaysia in the run-up to the Asian episode, agency costs can be
elevated by information asymmetries that arise from physical and cultural distance, as these gaps
serve to complicate the monitoring process. When asymmetries are significant, institutionallystrong countries may be grouped together with their weaker peers, subjecting them to contagion
effects during times of crisis.
The first two problems in the list above, weak supervision and data reporting, are closely
aligned under the umbrella of “regulatory structure.” When national statistics are incomplete, if
not downright false, it becomes exceedingly difficult for overseas firms to accurately gauge the
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merits of a potential investment in a given country. Because information is scarce, foreign
investors must rely in part on domestic authorities to regulate and supervise those institutions
receiving external capital (Vives 2006). Vives (2006) argues that this system is fundamentally
flawed, as domestic regulators often encounter the same data and transparency problems as
foreign investors. Additionally, regulators in emerging economies are often underfunded and
understaffed, further hindering their ability to monitor the financial sector (Vives 2006).
At first glance, an obvious solution to regulatory deficiencies is for emerging economies
to subscribe to international standards such as the Basel III banking accord. Fischer (1999)
argues that adherence to international norms eases the ability of countries to tap emergency
financing from bodies such as the IMF, which (as discussed below) act as the de facto
international lender of last resort. Standardized regulation and reporting also limit information
asymmetries and thus dramatically reduce the agency costs associated with lending to developing
nations. Yet there remains skepticism as to whether rules crafted by the G-20 and other
developed-nation groups are appropriate for emerging markets. Balin (2008) argues that
developing countries may lack the technical expertise to enforce complicated programs, while
Vives (2006) contends that advanced regulatory measures can be implemented only after data
provision is improved. Given these concerns, it may be necessary for the fiscal and monetary
authorities of emerging economies to develop a standardized regulatory approach tailored to their
specific needs. The IMF and World Bank can lend valuable technical assistance to this effort,
although such an arrangement would require international organizations to accept a secondary
role behind the regulatory authorities of participating nations.
Closely related to the notion of agency costs is that of uncertainty, which in many
emerging economies is raised by persistent macroeconomic and political instability. Uncertainty
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contributes to capital flight by driving away investors who seek clarity as to the nature and
timing of their returns, both in tranquil and stressful times. On the macroeconomic side, policy
makers in emerging nations face a difficult task in attempting to promote full employment, stable
inflation, and external competitiveness, as international capital flows can drive unwelcome
changes in domestic interest rates and the real exchange rate. Known as the “trilemma”17 this
problem is summarized neatly by Cordero and Montecino (2010), who note that “a country
cannot maintain, at the same time, full capital mobility, a fixed or managed exchange rate, and an
independent monetary policy.” Limiting uncertainty through the promotion of macroeconomic
stability therefore requires adoption of either capital controls or a purely floating exchange rate,
both of which are discussed in further detail below. On the political front, it is appropriate to
simply note that instability is “bad for business.” A solution to political troubles in the
developing world remains beyond the scope of this thesis.
Perhaps the most concrete proposal for combatting uncertainty on a global scale is the
creation of an international lender of last resort. Fischer (1999) provides a useful discussion of
the potential advantages, disadvantages, and design of such an institution. The international
lender of last resort would in Fischer’s (1999) view act as both a stabilizing and coordinating
agent in times of crisis. In this role, the LOLR would stand ready to provide foreign exchange to
countries facing huge calls on liabilities denominated in currencies other than their own. By
guaranteeing that countries have access to needed foreign exchange, the LOLR removes the
incentive by creditors to be “first in line” at the central bank in order to secure foreign currency
before it runs out. The lining-up phenomenon is paramount to the bank run process described by
Diamond and Dybvig (1983), and applies in an international setting to situations in which

17

Obstfeld and Taylor (1997).
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foreign capital flows rapidly reverse course. If investors are assured constant access to foreign
currency, then there is a reduced incentive to join the herd in pulling capital, and thus the risk of
coordination failure is limited ex ante (Fischer 1999). Coordination of private actors is a key
function of the lender of last resort in Fischer’s (1999) view, as a central authority through its
role as “crisis manager” can align expectations around a particular outcome, thereby reducing
uncertainty.
From a practical perspective, Fischer (1999) argues that the IMF already acts as a type of
international lender of last resort, providing emergency financing in the wake of crises across the
globe. However, relying on the IMF to act as the LOLR imparts a distinctly political element to
a role that in theory should be rules based, as the Fund is ultimately beholden to its member
countries. Stiglitz (2010), Radelet and Sachs (1998), and others show that the Fund’s
requirements for post-crisis financing often impose onerous, inappropriate conditions on
recipient nations. Any international lender of last resort must therefore be created as an
independent, apolitical body which operates under a clearly defined set of guidelines. Finally, an
international lender of last resort would likely generate a high degree of moral hazard in nations
which have access to it. Fischer (1999) contends that adherence to clearly defined policies,
along with regulatory improvements such as those discussed above, would minimize the impact
of moral hazard. Ultimately, a decision on whether to create an international lender of last resort
should rest on a determination of the willingness of participating countries to implement and
enforce agreed-upon rules and regulations.
Ensuring Current Account Stability
Policy makers seeking to limit exposure to twin crises also have a vested interest in
ensuring current account stability. From an empirical standpoint, there remains little evidence
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regarding the optimal deficit or surplus for a given country, complicating efforts to target a
specific balance-of-payments position. Governments should therefore pursue policies that
ensure a smooth transition between deficit and surplus, as opposed to the sudden and painful
shifts that often accompany crises.
An effective measure for promoting fluidity in the balance-of-payments is the imposition
of a flexible exchange rate regime. The primary advantage of purely flexible, also known as
floating, rates is that they are determined by market forces and adjust in real time. Countries
running a current account deficit will in the long-run experience a depreciation in their real
exchange rate, which through the trade channel will tend to push the country back toward
balance. This process contrasts with the dynamics present under a hard peg, wherein fluctuations
in the domestic price level relative to trading partners drive persistent changes in the real
exchange rate that foster long-run imbalances. A decline in the domestic price level relative to
trading partners leads to depreciation of the real exchange rate, while a rise in domestic prices
generates appreciation, allowing the country to accumulate a large current account deficit. For
balance to be achieved in the case of appreciation, countries must pursue either a nominal
devaluation of the currency or an “internal devaluation” through a contraction in the domestic
price level (Friedman 1953). Nominal devaluations of course wreak havoc on the balance sheets
of firms with foreign-denominated liabilities, generating and exacerbating twin crises (See
Section Two). Internal devaluations also carry enormous costs, as they force large declines in
real economic activity given nominal price rigidity (Calvo and Reinhart 2000; Obstfeld 2012;
Friedman 1953).
Implicit in this analysis is the assumption that countries must pursue either a pure float or
hard peg regime. In reality, many emerging nations operate somewhere in between, employing
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either a managed float or soft peg. Under a managed float, the monetary authority allows the
exchange rate to fluctuate but intervenes when it deems appropriate, typically in periods of high
volatility. Under a soft peg regime, the exchange rate is either fixed at a specific value by the
monetary authority (as opposed to by law under a currency board), or allowed to move within a
predetermined band. Soft pegs have received significant criticism from authors such as Fischer
(2001), Friedman (1953) and Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995), among others. For Fischer (2001), the
failure of soft pegs is illustrated by the fact that no regime of this sort, from Bretton Woods in the
post-war era to emerging nations in the 1990s, has ever survived long-term. Obstfeld and Rogoff
(1995) argue that the impermanence of soft pegs arises from credibility issues, as central banks
are faced with a tradeoff between defending the exchange rate and inflicting damage on the
domestic economy through interest rate hikes.
In his celebrated 1953 analysis, Milton Friedman offers perhaps the strongest critique of
soft peg systems. In Friedman’s (1953) view, the chief shortcoming of soft pegs is that they
promote destabilizing speculation by marking a clear point which traders can attack. Similar to
Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995), Friedman stresses the importance of credibility, arguing that traders
will attack a currency only when they believe that their actions will be successful. So long as the
central bank has any control over the exchange rate, it will in Friedman’s view at one point or
another turn toward domestic objectives and let the peg collapse, validating traders’ initial
expectations. Hanke (2008) highlights Friedman’s focus on credibility by noting that he was in
fact an advocate of hard-pegs in certain cases, as these regimes are not subject to discretion and
are therefore viewed as permanent. However, as the Argentine experience of 2001 illustrates,
even strong fixes are not immune to the vagaries of international capital markets.
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Calvo and Mishkin (2003) agree with Friedman’s assessment that hard pegs such as
currency boards or dollarization represent the only sustainable fixed regimes, yet give closer
attention to credibility issues associated with floats. According to Calvo and Mishkin (2003), the
institutions which support an exchange rate system are more important for stability purposes than
the system itself. If a central bank lacks public support or political independence, it is unlikely to
be able to influence market expectations, limiting the effectiveness of monetary policy and thus
removing a central advantage of floating rates (Calvo and Mishkin 2003). Furthermore, Calvo
and Mishkin (2003) note that a lack of credibility hampers the central bank’s ability to act as a
lender of last resort, as liquidity provision to the financial sector is likely to generate inflationary
expectations that do not arise when the monetary authority is well-respected. These issues
demonstrate that credibility problems are likely to arise any time domestic institutions are weak
or lack transparency, further reinforcing the importance of institutional upgrading for emerging
economies.
Just as fixed currencies are subject to speculation in financial markets, so too are flexible
ones. The key difference between speculation against fixed and flexible systems is that, while
flexible currencies tend to experience greater volatility (that is, movements both up and down),
fixed rates maintain their value until the bottom falls out at once, generating sudden shifts in
capital that force large contractions in the current account. Given that flexible rates both avoid
these one-time shifts and ensure a smoother transition between current account positions, policy
makers with an eye toward crisis prevention would be wise to consider some form of a floating
regime. Here the choice is between a pure float, which Calvo and Reinhart (2005) show exists
only in a select few countries such as the United States, or a managed float, wherein the
monetary authority uses its discretion to conduct direct or sterilized intervention in the foreign

56

exchange market. Managed floats would seem to fall outside the realm of criticism offered by
Friedman in his 1953 paper, as the central bank does not commit to a specific peg but rather
intervenes only when it sees fit. Because the exchange rate is allowed to fluctuate except for in
certain cases, managed floats can facilitate current account adjustment while avoiding a degree
of the volatility that often plagues floating currencies in emerging economies.
Cordero and Montecino (2010) note that managed floats, while more flexible than pegged
exchange rates, are not immune from the policy trilemma, as central banks will likely exercise
“discretion” whenever domestic interest rate hikes draw in capital and place significant pressure
on the currency to appreciate. The central bank typically reacts to appreciation by selling the
domestic currency, driving interest rates back down and nullifying any anti-inflationary
measures. In this sense, the managed float effectively becomes a peg and is rendered
inconsistent with domestic macroeconomic policy. Cordero and Montecino (2010) argue
forcefully for the use of capital controls as a means of avoiding this trilemma, as restrictions on
flows make interest rate arbitrage impossible or prohibitively costly. The arguments in favor of
capital controls are compelling in that they offer a viable framework under which to maintain
current account stability, and as such we analyze the nuances of control programs below.
Controlling International Capital Flows
Restrictions on the flow of international capital allow countries to pursue policies which
are consistent both with macroeconomic stability and an exchange rate that prevents sudden and
costly shifts in the current account. Yet perhaps the strongest advantage of capital controls
comes from the fact that they may be useful in preventing the accumulation of unsustainable
current account positions in the first place. By the simple balance-of-payments identity, current
account deficits must be offset by matching capital/financial account surpluses (Calvo and
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Reinhart 2000), and policies which impede capital inflows therefore also act to trim deficits.
Furthermore, because the inflows that fund deficits often reflect high liquidity and/or a short
maturity structure, capital controls could be effective in reducing the level of short-term debt
held in the economy, an action that our empirical results suggest would lessen overall fragility.
In an analysis of capital account policies during the 1990s, Montiel and Reinhart (1999)
find that explicit controls are generally successful in altering the maturity composition of inflows
away from short-term liabilities and toward FDI, though they find no evidence that these policies
reduce overall flows. Calvo and Reinhart (2000) reach a similar conclusion, although their study
is admittedly similar to Montiel and Reinhart (1999) and is thus likely to echo any
methodological or data shortcomings. Finally, De Gregorio, Edwards, and Valdés (2000) find
evidence that Chile’s capital control system reduced short-term flows while leaving total flows
relatively unchanged. Together, these studies lend support to the notion that the primary
achievement of capital controls is a reduction in the accumulation of short-term liabilities, the
dangers of which are discussed at length in Section Three.
Montiel and Reinhart (1999) estimate the effect of capital controls by constructing an
index that takes on a value of 1 when controls are in the form of strict prudential regulations, and
a value of 2 when policies consist of “prohibitions, deposit requirements, or financial transaction
taxes.” This analysis yields valuable insights as to the efficacy of capital controls in general, yet
it fails to make the critical policy distinction between price-based and quantitative measures. In
a more specific case study approach, Cordero and Montecino (2010) explore this distinction by
highlighting the major components of inflow control programs in Malaysia (1989-1995),
Colombia (1993-1998), Chile (1989-1998), and Brazil (1992-1998).
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Malaysia, Chile, and Colombia all experimented in the 1990s with some form of an
unremunerated reserve requirement (URR), which requires foreign creditors to deposit a
specified percentage of their investment at the central bank. These accounts are held for a fixed
period of time and pay no interest, acting as a price-based control by effectively placing a tax on
all inflows (Rodrik and Velasco 1999). Cordero and Montecino (2010) show that in Malaysia
and Chile, the URR was successful in pushing the composition of inflows toward longer-dated
securities, while in Colombia evidence is mixed. Malaysia and Brazil imposed quantity-based
measures, which in the former acted in addition to a URR and included a ban on the issuance of
securities with a maturity of less than one year to foreign investors (Cordero and Montecino
2010). Brazil’s quantity-based measures were aimed directly at balance sheets, placing a limit
on the stock of liabilities firms could hold in dollars (Cordero and Montecino 2010). Cordero
and Montecino (2010) note that there remains disagreement on the effectiveness of Brazil’s
program, suggesting that quantity-based controls may be less effective than price-based measures
in addressing inflow problems.
In order to develop a deeper understanding of the operational characteristics of pricebased control systems, one can look to Chile in the 1991-1998 period, whose experience is
summarized by Rodrik and Velasco (1999). Responding to a high volume of inflows, Chile in
1991 imposed an unremunerated reserve requirement of 20%, later raised to 30% in 1992
(Rodrik and Velasco 1999; Edwards 1999). This account was held for three months to one year,
effectively placing a tax on inflows that Edwards (1999) estimates reached as high as 5.5% for
the shortest investments. Cordero and Montecino (2010) argue that the main impetus behind the
URR system was a desire by the Banco Central de Chile to conduct an anti-inflationary monetary
policy without placing upward pressure on the exchange rate. In this strategy one finds a
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practical application of the trilemma-breaking advantages that Cordero and Montecino (2010)
use in making their case for capital controls.
Between 1991 when controls were implemented and 1998 when they were removed,
Chile’s short-term exposure did in fact decline, although total flows continued to increase,
consistent with more general empirical work (Edwards 1999). However, Edwards (1999) finds
that capital controls significantly raised the cost of capital for Chilean firms. The Chilean
experience illustrates the inherent conflict in pursuing policies that limit crisis exposure on the
one hand, yet have a potentially negative impact on growth and investment on the other. As
Edwards (1999) argues, macroeconomic policy makers must ultimately evaluate programs within
the context of their country’s broader vulnerability to twin crises, weighing whether the benefits
of stabilization exceed the costs of slower growth and inflow-fueled investment. A large factor
in this calculus is whether the country has a properly developed regulatory and monitoring
structure, as nations with strong prudential regulation are better able to deal with inflows and
thus less likely to require capital controls (Edwards 1999).
Crisis Response: A Brief Overview
While this thesis is concerned with identifying the general determinants of twin episodes
and what measures might be undertaken to prevent them, it bears discussing briefly the role of
response policies in stemming or exacerbating crises. Following the outbreak of a twin crisis,
authorities are faced with two, potentially opposing, objectives: stabilizing the exchange rate
while also propping-up the financial sector. The typical mechanism used to prevent depreciation
is an increase in domestic interest rates, as higher returns theoretically draw capital from abroad
and increase demand for the domestic currency. Furman et al. (1998) call attention to an
important flaw in this theory, noting that interest rate hikes raise the debt burden of leveraged
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borrowers and thus increase bankruptcy risk. The authors argue that in cases where interest rates
push bankruptcy risk to excessively high levels, capital will in fact leave the country, placing
downward pressure on the exchange rate and preventing authorities from achieving either of
their objectives. Radelet and Sachs (1998) reach a similar conclusion, noting that IMFmandated, pro-cyclical monetary policy placed an undue burden on debtors in the wake of the
Asian crisis, deepening the extent of the contraction. Radelet and Sachs (1998) further note that
currencies continued to depreciate in Asia following the implementation of tight monetary
policies.
It is clear from both the theoretical and historical analyses done by Furman et al. (1998),
Radelet and Sachs (1998), and others that higher interest rates are not guaranteed to stabilize an
exchange rate, and in many cases inflict further damage on the banking system through a
financial accelerator mechanism akin to that described by Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist
(1996). This calls into question the standard policy package offered by the IMF in the wake of
many twin crises. Surveying the alternatives to tight monetary policy, it is not clear that a viable
option exists, meaning that authorities may ultimately have to choose between saving the
exchange rate and saving the banks. One proposal is the imposition of controls on capital
outflows, which Edwards (1999) argues tend to fail due to easy and widespread evasion.
Edwards (1999) finds that Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico in the 1980s experienced long
downturns even after the imposition of outflow controls, although Cordero and Montecino
(2010) find that Malaysia’s use of outflow controls was effective in stabilizing the economy
following the 1997 episode. Whether or not outflow controls are the appropriate mechanism for
stabilizing a crisis-stricken economy, it is evident from the stylized facts that the use of tight
monetary policy as has historically been advocated by the IMF is not the way forward.
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Related to the issue of monetary policy is that of fiscal policy, which plays an equally
important role in the response to twin episodes. Radelet and Sachs (1998b) note that the IMF
required Asian nations to pursue fiscal austerity measures as a means of reducing current account
deficits following the regional crisis. The authors argue that pro-cyclical tightening was
unnecessary given that capital outflows and real exchange rate depreciation were forcing a quick
shift in the current account in the absence of changes to fiscal policy. If the aim of IMF-led
austerity measures is to bring about a reduction in the current account deficit, then the negative
consequences of these measures only further highlight the importance of pursuing policies that
limit deficit accumulation ex ante.
Stiglitz (2010) is also critical of standard post-crisis fiscal policies for their adverse
effects on real economic performance, arguing that austerity measures imposed on developing
nations far exceed those implemented in developed countries. Weisbrot (2015) points to
Argentina’s experience post-2001 as an example of a successful stimulus-driven recovery,
although the persistence of mid-double digit inflation as of writing should temper enthusiasm for
the Argentine model. Rather than pointing to the Argentinian experience, U.S and Eurozone
nations, along with the institutions they lead, should instead look toward their own policies in the
aftermath of the Great Depression, which represents the most successful implementation of
Keynesian demand management in modern history. A revival of these strategies would likely
prove useful in the developing world.
The above discussion of crisis response measures is by no means an exhaustive one, yet
is meant to highlight the basic observation that the pro-cyclical policies required by international
institutions tend to aggravate downturns without a clear benefit of stabilization. Future research
is needed on both the efficacy and consequences of monetary policy in addressing crises in open,
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emerging economies. A relevant research agenda should also focus on ways to design fiscal
policies that promote aggregate demand stabilization without stoking inflation or placing a
burden on a country’s long-term financial situation. Given the complex issues surrounding crisis
response, we believe appropriate prevention measures such as those discussed above are the most
effective way to achieve macroeconomic stability while promoting long-run growth.

VII: Conclusion
Since the latter portion of the twentieth century, the recurrence of twin crises has defined
the financial histories of much of the developing world. The large swings in output that follow
twin crises have acted as an impediment to financial development, capital investment, and broad
economic growth, generating upheaval that has extended beyond economics to the political and
social realms. Within the theoretical and empirical literature, the debate has centered on whether
fundamental factors are to blame, or whether crises are driven primarily by financial panic and
contagion.
This thesis contributes to the wider debate by analyzing the underlying determinants of
twin crises through a probit econometric study across a panel of 48 countries during the 19802013 period. Current account deficits are found to be a robust driver of crisis vulnerability, with
the probability of twin episodes increasing in the overall deficit as a percentage of GDP. We
also find evidence that real exchange rate appreciation and higher levels of short-term debt
relative to reserves act to increase crisis vulnerability. These results should be interpreted
cautiously, as they are potentially subject to bias that arises from cross-sectional and time-variant
heterogeneity.
While fundamental weakness or international illiquidity may explain the specifics of
certain episodes, it is the fragility of international capital markets that ultimately lies at the heart
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of twin crises. The boom-bust nature of capital flows drives emerging nations between periods
of rapid growth followed by equally swift decline, as shifts in investor sentiment lead to sharp
reversals in the direction of funds. Because foreign capital is oftentimes used to finance a
current account deficit, outflows place immense pressure on the exchange rate regime, while a
run on the country simultaneously drains assets from the banking system. High agency costs
play a central role in this process, subjecting emerging nations to a “flight to quality” in times of
stress.
In order to avoid the substantial costs of twin crises, emerging nations must commit to
policies that reduce agency costs, ensure current account stability, and control the flow of
international capital. Institutional improvements, particularly in terms of data transparency and
reporting, would be effective means of limiting information asymmetries and lowering agency
costs, ultimately reducing the likelihood of panic-driven capital shifts. Emerging nations can
also promote fluidity in the current account by implementing a managed float exchange rate
regime, which combined with price-based controls on capital inflows would help authorities
achieve monetary independence while avoiding destabilizing currency volatility. The promotion
of long-run growth and development in emerging economies relies heavily on conditions of
financial stability, and by pursuing programs that prevent the outbreak of twin crises, policy
makers can lay the groundwork for measures that bring sustained prosperity to a large portion of
the global population.
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Appendix
Appendix One:
Data notes, sources, and calculations
Countries included in full panel shown in Table 1: Argentina, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Botswana,
Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Fiji,
Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Honduras, Indonesia, India, Jamaica, Jordan, St. Lucia, Sri Lanka,
Lesotho, Morocco, Maldives, Mexico, Mauritius, Malaysia, Nigeria, Pakistan, Panama, Peru,
Philippines, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Senegal, El Salvador, Swaziland, Thailand, Tunisia,
Turkey, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Venezuela, Vanuatu, Samoa, Zambia

East Asia and Pacific country group: China, Fiji, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Papua New
Guinea, Thailand, Vanuatu, Samoa

Latin America and Caribbean country group: Argentina, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile,
Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Grenada, Guatemala,
Honduras, Jamaica, St. Lucia, Mexico, Panama, Peru, Paraguay, El Salvador, St. Vincent and the
Grenadines, Venezuela

Middle East and North Africa country group: Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Tunisia

South Asia country group: India, Sri Lanka, Maldives, Pakistan

Sub-Saharan Africa country group: Botswana, Ghana, Lesotho, Mauritius, Nigeria, Senegal,
Swaziland, Zambia

Upper middle income group: Argentina, Brazil, Botswana, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica,
Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Grenada, Jamaica, Jordan, St. Lucia, Maldives,
Mexico, Mauritius, Malaysia, Panama, Peru, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, St. Vincent and the
Grenadines, Venezuela

Lower middle income group: Belize, Bolivia, Egypt, Fiji, Ghana, Guatemala, Honduras,
Indonesia, India, Sri Lanka, Lesotho, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan Philippines, Papua New
Guinea, Paraguay, Senegal, El Salvador, Swaziland, Vanuatu, Samoa, Zambia
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Table 4: Data sources and calculations
Variable
Definition
C

Equals 1 when (FAt-1 – FAt)/(GDPt-1) < 0.05 and
FAt-1 < 0, where FA = net financial account.
Negative values indicate capital inflows.

STDR

Short-term external debt as a percentage of total
reserves (including gold). Short-term defined by
the World Bank as all debt with an original
maturity of one year or less. Data in USD
millions.

DSTDR

Dummy variable equals 1 when short-term debt
exceeds total reserves, and 0 otherwise.

BMR

Ratio of broad money to total reserves. Includes
M2 plus certificates of deposit, large time
deposits, and commercial paper. Data in USD
millions.
Dummy variable equals 1 when explicit deposit
insurance scheme is in place in year t, and 0
otherwise. Insurance schemes identified using a
World Bank 2010 survey along with official
sources from individual countries. Only
explicitly recognized programs are set equal to 1.
Growth in the ratio of domestic credit to nominal
GDP between year t and t-3. Credit data
converted to USD millions at average annual
LCU/USD exchange rate.
Percentage change in real gross domestic product
between year t and t-3. Data in USD millions
indexed to 2010.
Percentage change in real effective exchange rate
between year t and t-3. Nominal effective
exchange rate calculated as trade-weighted
average USD cross rate for 67 trading partners.
CPI deflator calculated with identical weights.
Indexed to 2007.
Current account balance as a percentage of
nominal GDP. Data in USD millions.

DI

CREDITGR

GDPGR

RER

CAD

Source
Net financial account per IMF
International Financial
Statistics (IFS). Certain values
are interpolated for missing
years.
World Bank World
Development Indicators
(WDI). Central bank sources
are used where WDI data is
unavailable. Certain values are
interpolated for missing years.
WDI. Central bank sources are
used where WDI data is
unavailable.
WDI. Certain values are
interpolated for missing years.

Demirgüç-Kunt, Kane, and
Laeven (2013).

Credit, GDP, and exchange
rate data per WDI. Certain
values are interpolated for
missing years.
WDI. Certain values are
interpolated for missing years.
Darvas (2012).

Current account data per IFS.
Nominal GDP data per WDI.
Certain values are interpolated
for missing years.
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1207

1211

1249

Total number of observations

Coefficients represent the effect on crisis probability of a one unit increase in the explanatory variable. Model estimated using maximum likelihood estimation.

739.3
780.0
0.902

0.0002
0.0006
0.0006

0.0001
-0.005
-0.011

738.2
779.0
0.903

-0.006

0.0001
-0.005
-0.011

767.2
808.2
0.902

0.0001
-0.005
-0.012
0.0000
-0.0004
0.0003
-0.006

0.0002
0.0005
0.0006
-0.006

Number of Lags
(2)
(1)

Number of Lags
(2)
(1)

Number of Lags
(2)
(1)

Akaike information criterion
Bayes-Schwarz information criterion
Count R-squared

Short-term debt as a percentage of reserves
Broad money/reserves
Explicit deposit insurance dummy
4 year change in credit
4 year change in real GDP
4 year change in real exchange rate
Current account deficit as a percentage of GDP

Fundamental and CAD two lags

Fundamental variables two lags

One Lag

Dependent variable = 1 when reversal of capital inflows exceeds 5% of GDP

Table 5: Determination of lags for primary model

Appendix Two:
Supplementary econometric tables
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Table 6: Country group results
Dependent variable = 1 when reversal of capital inflows exceeds 5% of
GDP
East
Asia

Latin
America

Middle
EastN.Africa

0.0001

0.0001

0.0010**

(0.0010)

(0.0004)

(0.0004)

Broad money/reservest-1

-0.002
(0.056)

-0.002
(0.020)

-0.028
(0.097)

Explicit deposit insurance dummyt-1

-0.010
(0.302)

0.003
(0.174)

-0.051
(0.466)

4 year % change in creditt-2

0.000
(0.008)

0.000
(0.203)

0.006
(0.945)

4 year % change in real GDPt-2

-0.001***
(1.060)

0.004**
(0.721)

-0.001*
(2.041)

4 year % change in real exchange ratet-2

0.004
(0.892)

0.000
(0.299)

0.003
(1.000)

0.003*

0.009***

0.000

(0.013)

(0.009)

(0.035)

Akaike information criterion
Bayes-Schwarz information criterion
Count R-squared

197.1
226.2
0.889

418.7
454.1
0.882

82.5
104.8
0.908

Total number of observations

280

618

120

Short-term debt as a percentage of
reservest-1

Current account deficit as a percentage of
GDPt-1

Coefficients represent the effect on crisis probability of a one unit increase in the explanatory variable. Standard errors are in
parentheses. Model estimated using maximum likelihood estimation. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and
1% levels, respectively. See Appendix One for countries included in each group.
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Table 7: Country group results (cont.)
Dependent variable = 1 when reversal of capital inflows exceeds 5% of GDP
South Asia

Sub-Saharan Africa

Short-term debt as a percentage of reservest-1

-0.0006
(0.0022)

0.0001
(0.0006)

Broad money/reservest-1

0.153**
(0.092)

-0.005
(0.022)

Explicit deposit insurance dummyt-1

-

0.009
(0.448)

4 year % change in creditt-2

-0.0411
(1.200)

0.0002**
(0.054)

4 year % change in real GDPt-2

0.2327
(3.797)

0.002
(1.116)

4 year % change in real exchange ratet-2

0.8021**
(3.951)

0.0004
(0.290)

Current account deficit as a percentage of GDPt-1

0.134**
(0.061)

0.007***
(0.013)

Akaike information criterion
Bayes-Schwarz information criterion
Count R-squared

37.5
55.2
0.957

160.8
188.7
0.897

Total number of observations

92

242

Coefficients represent the effect on crisis probability of a one unit increase in the explanatory variable. For South Asia,
coefficients represent maximum likelihood estimates rather than marginal effects. Standard errors are in parentheses.
Model estimated using maximum likelihood estimation. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels,
respectively. See Appendix One for countries included in each group.
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Table 8: Income group results
Dependent variable = 1 when reversal of capital inflows exceeds 5% of GDP
Upper Middle
Income

Lower Middle
Income

Short-term debt as a percentage of reservest-1

0.0001**
(0.0004)

0.0001
(0.0004)

Broad money/reservest-1

-0.005
(0.021)

-0.003
(0.017)

Explicit deposit insurance dummyt-1

0.009
(0.150)

-0.027
(1.820)

4 year % change in creditt-2

-0.000
(0.025)

-0.000
(0.004)

4 year % change in real GDPt-2

0.001
(0.564)

-0.001*
(0.761)

4 year % change in real exchange ratet-2

0.001
(0.293)

0.001
(0.219)

0.007***

0.006***

(0.008)

(0.009)

Akaike information criterion
Bayes-Schwarz information criterion
Count R-squared

515.8
553.0
0.892

427.2
463.7
0.903

Total number of observations

777

711

Current account deficit as a percentage of
GDPt-1

Coefficients represent the effect on crisis probability of a one unit increase in the explanatory variable. Standard errors
are in parentheses. Model estimated using maximum likelihood estimation. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%,
5%, and 1% levels, respectively. See Appendix One for countries included in each group.
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Table 9: Robustness to various crisis thresholds
Dependent variable = 1 when reversal of capital inflows exceeds specified % of GDP
5%
threshold

4%
threshold

3%
threshold

Short-term debt as a percentage of reservest-1

0.0001***
(0.0003)

0.0001**
(0.0003)

0.0001**
(0.0003)

Broad money/reservest-1

-0.005
(0.014)

-0.006
(0.013)

-0.006
(0.012)

Explicit deposit insurance dummyt-1

-0.011
(0.123)

-0.005
(0.109)

0.005
(0.099)

4 year % change in creditt-2

0.0002**
(0.051)

-0.0000
(0.021)

-0.0001
(0.021)

4 year % change in real GDPt-2

0.0006
(0.498)

-0.0001
(0.459)

-0.0005
(0.426)

4 year % change in real exchange ratet-2

0.0006
(0.188)

0.0007*
(0.173)

0.0010**
(0.159)

0.006***

0.008***

0.001***

(0.007)

(0.006)

(0.006)

Current account deficit as a percentage of
GDPt-1

Akaike information criterion
Bayes-Schwarz information criterion
Count R-squared

738.2
779.0
0.903

923.7
964.5
0.862

1118.7
1159.5
0.810

Total number of observations

1211

1211

1211

Coefficients represent the effect on crisis probability of a one unit increase in the explanatory variable. Standard
errors are in parentheses. Model estimated using maximum likelihood estimation. *, **, and *** denote
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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Table 10: Correlation matrix for explanatory variables
STDR
BMR
DI
CREDITGR
1.0000
0.7572
-0.0699
-0.0097
STDR
0.7572
1.0000
0.1226
-0.0156
BMR
-0.0699
-0.1226
1.0000
-0.0157
DI
-0.0156
-0.0157
1.0000
CREDITGR -0.0097
-0.1644
-0.0522
-0.0253
-0.0412
GDPGR
0.0107
-0.0462
0.0821
-0.0017
RER
-0.0523
-0.1107
0.2201
-0.1006
CAD

GDPGR

RER

CAD

-0.1644

0.0107

-0.0523

-0.0522

-0.0462

-0.1107

-0.0253

0.0821

0.2201

-0.0412

-0.0017

-0.1006

1.0000

-0.0294

0.1015

-0.0294

1.0000

-0.0245

0.1015

-0.0245

1.0000
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